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ARTICLE
JUDGE NOT UNDER AN UNJUST STANDARD: WHY AN
INVESTMENT ADVISER'S FIDUCIARY DUTY AS TO FEES
UNDER SECTION 36(B) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY
ACT OF 1940 IS ILLUSORY AND UNJUST UNTIL AN
ADJUDICATED CASE ILLUSTRATES A BREACH OF THE
FIDUCIARY DUTY
Tory L. Lucas'
I. INTRODUCTION

Investment companies manage trillions of dollars of other people's
money, and they charge significant fees for their services. In building
wealth, the amount paid for investment fees matters. This Article discusses
the federal regulation of the fees that investment advisers charge to
investments like mutual funds. Specifically, this Article analyzes the
federally imposed fiduciary duty that regulates investment advisers as they
extract fees from their customers. Believe it or not, even though trillions of
dollars have been entrusted by hundreds of millions of Americans to
investment advisers for decades, no court has found that even a single
investment adviser has violated its fiduciary duty with respect to advisory
fees.
America's wealthiest individuals stand on the tip of the economic
pyramid. The wealthiest 400 Americans are worth a breathtaking $2.3
trillion.' Just look at the number of zeroes needed to illustrate that large
t Tory L. Lucas, Associate Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law; B.A.,
magna cum laude, Culver-Stockton College; J.D., summa cum laude, Creighton University
School of Law; LL.M., Arthur Mag Fellow of Law, University of Missouri - Kansas City
School of Law. I am grateful for the outstanding contributions made to this Article by my
research assistants, Ruisi "Grace" Guo and Erika L. Lukenbill. Finally, I serve as a faculty
adviser to the
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which asked that I draft an Article

specifically for this Symposium Issue. I agreed, but I explained that my Article would not
align perfectly with the Symposium's title, "Dodd-Frank, the Financial Crisis, and a Christian
View of Financial Markets," because my Article would not address Dodd-Frank or the 2008
financial crisis. Notwithstanding, this Article does present a Christian worldview of federally
regulated financial markets, which tracks the overall goal of this Symposium Issue.
1. Kieran Corcoran, The Rich Get Richer: 400 Wealthiest Americans Now Worth
$2.3trillion as $34billion Mark Zuckerberg Cracks Forbes Top 10 for the First Time, UK
MAILONLINE (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2773672/The-richricher-400-wealthiest-Americans-worth-2-3TRILLION-34billion-Mark-Zuckerberg-cracks-
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number: $2,300,000,000,000. If you were to picture numerous piles of
money, each containing one million dollars (i.e., $1,000,000, a paltry sum,
to be sure, at least by comparison), you would have to picture 2.3 million
piles! The combined wealth of America's two richest billionaires, Bill Gates
and Warren Buffett, totals $130.5 billion (i.e., $130,500,000,000).2 Whether
thinking about the $2.3 trillion number or the substantially smaller $130.5
billion number, these figures represent a lot of money. But those
astonishing sums of money pale when compared to how much wealth is
being managed by investment companies through products such as mutual
funds on behalf of millions of Americans. At the end of 2013, 98 million
Americans entrusted $17.1 trillion (i.e., $17,100,000,000,000) of their wealth
to U.S.-registered investment companies The sheer number and size of
these investment companies have grown drastically over the past few
decades. At the end of 2013, they managed 22 percent of the financial assets
of American households, more than tenfold the 2 percent they managed in
1980. 4

Forbes-10-time.html). Of course, these types of statistics are subject to change and are always
in flux.
2. FORBES, The Forbes 400: The Richest People in America, http://www.forbes.com
/forbes-400/list/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack
Obama routinely talked about how millionaires and billionaires do not pay their fair share of
taxes. Roberton William, Taxing Millionaires: Obama's Buffett Rule, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013,
2:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2013/O4/17/taxing-milhionaires-obamasbuffett-rule/; Rebecca Christie, Obama's Tax Pitch: The Income Gap That MillionairesShould
Fill, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1006/obama-pre-election-tax-battle-shift-pits-milhionaires-against-midde-cass.htm.
I could
not help but wonder if he thought that billionaires and millionaires are similarly situated
members of the same class. For example, if you simply compare the dynamic duo of Bill
Gates and Warren Buffett, billionaires worth $130.5 billion, with let's say a couple of run-ofthe-miU millionaires who are worth $2 million, the two billionaires are worth 65,250 times
what those two millionaires are worth. That seems significant, but I have noticeably
digressed.
3. Investment Company Institute, 2014 Investment Company Fact Book: A Review of
Trends and Activities in the U.S. Investment Company Industry 8 (54th ed. 2014), availableat
http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2014-factbook.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2014). Investment
companies offer various products to individual investors, including mutual funds, closedend funds, exchange-traded funds or ETFs, and unit investment trusts or UITs. See id. at 8.
At the end of 2013, $15.018 trillion was in mutual funds, $279 billion was in closed-end
funds, $1.675 trillion was in ETFs, and $87 billion was in UIFs. Id. at 9. This Article will
mostly reference mutual funds for ease of reading, but the principles discussed apply equally
to all assets managed by investment companies no matter the product, e.g., mutual or closedend funds, ETFs, or UIFs.
4. Id. at 10.
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'Even though investment companies offer various products ranging from
mutual funds to exchange-traded funds,5 this Article focuses on mutual
funds for ease of discussion. A mutual fund can be defined as "a pool of
assets, consisting primarily of portfolio securities, and belonging to the
individual investors holding shares in the fund."6 These funds are not selfoperated, but instead are normally "formed, sold, and managed by external
organizations [called investment advisers] that are separately owned and
operated."7 These investment advisers select the investments for and
operate the day-to-day business of the funds in exchange for advisory fees
that are often based on a fixed percentage of fund assets.' This Article
discusses the staggering amount of fees extracted from mutual funds and
the fiduciary duty that investment advisers have when it comes to extracting
those fees in exchange for advisory services.
To put it mildly, the relationship between a mutual fund and its
investment adviser is unique, unlike the normal business relationship
between buyers and sellers.9 The uniqueness stems from the fund's
organizational structure under which the investment adviser provides the
fund with most management services, while the fund investors purchase
shares in the fund and rely exclusively on the investment adviser's services. 0
As a practical matter, a mutual fund has no way of severing its relationship
with the investment adviser, which normally creates and then operates the
fund.1 As a result of the captive nature of this relationship that spawns
conflicts of interest, "the forces of arm's-length bargaining do not work in
the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of
the American economy."12 Without free-market forces that promote

5. See supra note 2.
6. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,480 (1979).

7. U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, Inv. Co. Amendments Act of 1970, S.
REP. No. 91-184, at 5, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901 (May 21, 1969).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that given this unique aspect of how mutual
funds are structured, "[t]he relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is
fraught with potential conflicts of interest ....
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481 (1979)
(citing Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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competition and bargaining, captive funds often lack the ability to seek
lower advisory fees.13
In response to the structural conflicts of interest in the mutual fund
industry, the captive nature of many mutual funds, and the massive
amounts of money in this sector of the economy, Congress enacted section
36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA") to protect mutual
fund shareholders. It imposes a fiduciary duty on a mutual fund's
investment adviser with respect to its receipt of compensation. 4 The
governing standard that determines whether an investment adviser has
breached its fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation has
been well known for over three decades:
To [violate] § 36(b), . . . the adviser-manager must charge a fee

that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the
product of arm's-length bargaining. 5
To any enterprising judge, attorney, or law student, this so-called
Gartenbergstandard 16 seems pretty straightforward and should be easy to
apply to facts to reach a legal conclusion as to when an investment adviser
has breached its fiduciary duty. Tragically, that is not the case and might
never be the case. Like a modern-day search.for Raphus cucullatus, 7 you
will be hard-pressed to have a sighting of a mutual fund shareholder who
wins a section 36(b) fiduciary duty case. In the forty-five years in which
section 36(b) has provided federal protection for mutual fund shareholders
against excessive fees by investment advisers, not a single adjudicated case
reports a shareholder victory. 8
13. For an in-depth explanation of the structure of investment companies, see William
A. Birdthistle, CompensatingPower: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund
Industry,80 TUL. L.REV. 1401, 1423-24 (2006).

14. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
15. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982); see
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 346 (2010).

16. The term "Gartenbergstandard" resulted from the name of the case that interpreted
section 36(b) to create the governing legal standard.
17. "Raphus cucullatus is perhaps best known as the dodo bird." Tory L. Lucas, But I'm
Not Twenty-one Yet: How Section 3B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Ignored
Congress's Intent to EnhanceSentences Onlyfor Adults at Least Twenty-one-Years of Age Who
Corrupt Minors by Using Them to Commit Federal Offenses-and What Federal District
Courts Can Do About It, 53 S.TEX. L. REv. 205, 268 n.264 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Amy Y.Yeung & Kristen J. Freeman, Gartenberg, Jones, and the Meaning of
Fiduciary: A Legislative Investigation of Section 36(b), 35 DEL J. CORP. L. 483, 490 (2010)
(citing JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1211 (3d ed.
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In teaching legal reasoning and how to learn the law, I challenge my law
students to clearly state the governing legal standard, explain the purpose
behind the law, and provide a factual illustration of how the standard
applies. As described briefly above, the first two tasks in section 36(b)
litigation can be accomplished in short order with little effort. The third
task does not fall readily off the tongue. Can anyone-whether investment
adviser, mutual fund shareholder, attorney, or judge-look at all of the
services provided by an investment adviser to a mutual fund and then
determine the appropriate range of compensation for those services that
indicates arm's-length bargaining? That is, can anyone confidently illustrate
factually in a contested case when an investment adviser breaches its
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation under section
36(b)?
This Article contends that if one cannot illustrate when a legal standard
is violated, then there is no legal standard; there is no legal protection. It is
illusory. It might set a theoretical or moral obligation, but that obligation
cannot be enforced. That has been the state of affairs in section 36(b)
litigation for four decades.
As the opening paragraph revealed, average Americans entrust over
$17.1 trillion of their savings to investment advisers, who create and operate
mutual funds in exchange for fees. As you will discover in reading this
Article, investment advisers charge lower fees to the wealthiest. Americans
than they do to average Americans. This Article contends that the
wealthiest Americans can freely and fiercely bargain with investment
advisers over services and fees, giving them the ability to walk away from
any bad deal on low services or high fees. This bargaining power is
noticeably absent from the captive retail mutual funds that are available to
millions of average Americans.
The lack of arm's-length bargaining by millions of Americans results in
higher fees and has a direct impact on wealth creation. Between 2012 and
2013, Americans entrusted a staggering $2.3 trillion of additional capital to
investment companies.'9 That $2.3 trillion figure can be used to illustrate a
point. In addition to representing the additional amount of money
2001)) (stating that "post-Gartenberg,no plaintiff shareholder has persuaded a court that an
[investment] adviser breached its fiduciary duty by charging excessive fees."); Jones v. Harris
Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (Posner, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (recognizing that [s]ubsequent litigation [after Gartenberg]in

excessive fee cases has resulted almost uniformly in judgments for the defendants ...
although there have been some notable settlements wherein defendants have agreed to
prospective reduction in the fee schedule."' (quoting Cox ET AL., supra, at 1211)).
19. Investment Company FactBook, supra note 3, at 8.
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entrusted to investment companies in the past year, $2.3 trillion also
represents the net worth of the 400 wealthiest Americans. These are the
individuals who can freely bargain over investment services and fees.
Investors in captive retail mutual funds have little bargaining power, and
they pay higher fees for investor services. Even if the wealthiest Americans
and average Americans get the same performance from investment advisers
over time, the wealthiest Americans will see their savings grow more rapidly
than what average Americans will enjoy due to the differences in advisory
fees. For example, let's simply compare how higher fees impact the $2.3
trillion that we have been discussing. Please assume that (1) the 400
wealthiest Americans entrust their $2.3 trillion with an investment adviser
who charges .5% of assets under management and delivers 8% per year for
forty years and (2) millions of average Americans also entrust their
collective $2.3 trillion to the same investment adviser who charges 1% of
assets under management and delivers 8% per year for forty years. Without
any additional investments, the average Americans will have suffered over
$7 trillion in higher fees for the same investment results. Net fees (and
without assuming taxation), the 400 wealthiest Americans' $2.3 trillion
investment will balloon to over $41 trillion, while the $2.3 trillion belonging
to millions of average Americans will top out at just over $34 trillion. Fees
matter in a big, big way!
Section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty was intended to assuage this negative effect
from the lack of spirited competition over fees for captive mutual funds. But
it has failed miserably to carry out this intent. This Article exposes the
illusory, unjust legal standard that implements section 36(b)'s fiduciary
duty under which investment advisers operate. To carry out this task, the
Article will first explain section 36(b)'s legislative text, purpose, and history.
Next, the Article will showcase the judicial history of section 36(b)
litigation; in the process, it will highlight a massive cavity in four decades of
caselaw that has resulted in not a single, adjudicated case in which a mutual
fund shareholder has prevailed. Finally, this Article will provide some
thoughts on how section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty and the accompanying four
decades of litigation can be viewed through the lens of a Judeo-Christian
worldview.
II. LEGISLATIVE TEXT AND PURPOSE
As mentioned in the Introduction section, section 36(b) of the ICA
provides federal protection for mutual fund shareholders by requiring that
the fund's investment adviser meet a fiduciary duty with respect to its
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receipt of compensation for the services it provides.2 ° Specifically, federal
law establishes the following fiduciary duty for investment advisers:
the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall
be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of
compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature,
paid by such registered investment company, or by the security
holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated
person of such investment adviser.2'
A violation of this federally protected fiduciary duty can be enforced by
bringing a lawsuit against the offending investment adviser by either the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") or a security holder of the
investment company (e.g., mutual fund shareholder).22 The plaintiff bears
the burden to prove a breach of fiduciary duty.23 If a plaintiff successfully
proves that an investment adviser breached its fiduciary duty, an award of
damages is limited to a period of one year before the suit was brought and
"to the actual damages resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty and shall
in no event exceed the amount of compensation or payments received from
such investment company, or the security holders thereof, by" the
investment adviser.24
Congress's purpose in enacting the ICA was to support "the national
public interest and the interest of investors" by ensuring that investors are
not "adversely affected when investment companies are organized,
operated, managed, or their portfolio securities are selected, in the interest
of... investment advisers ... rather than in the interest of [share]holders"
and "when investment companies . . . are not subjected to adequate

independent scrutiny."25 Congress "declared that the policy and purposes of
...[the

ICA] ...are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the

conditions.., which adversely affect the national public interest and the
interest of investors."2 6 Congress instructed courts to interpret the ICA to
carry out these declared policies and purposes.27

20. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Id.; see id. § 80a-2(a)(7) (defining "Commission" as the "Securities and Exchange
Commission").
23. Id. § 80a-35(b)(1).
24. Id. § 80a-35(b)(3).
25. Id. § 80a-1(2), (5).
26. Id. § 80a- 1.
27. Id.
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Tellingly, section 36(b)'s legislative history" tracks the textual
declaration of section 36(b)'s purpose. According to the United States
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency ("the Senate Committee"),
"the unique structure of mutual funds has made it difficult for the courts to
apply traditional fiduciary standards" when examining fees.29 The Senate
Committee, therefore, "adopted the basic principle that, in view of the
potential conflicts of interest involved in the setting of these fees, there
should be effective means for the courts to act where mutual fund
shareholders or the SEC believe there has been a breach of fiduciary duty."3"
To legislatively implement that purpose, the Senate Committee sought a
lofty goal:
[to] make it clear that, as a matter of federal law, the investment
adviser . . . has a fiduciary duty with respect to mutual fund
shareholders. It provides an effective method whereby the courts
can determine whether there has been a breach of this duty by
the adviser..
with respect to their compensation from the
fund.3
This Article argues that the Senate Committee was way off in its prediction
that it had drafted a clear standard that courts could interpret and apply
effectively to hold investment advisers to their fiduciary duty. In over four
decades of searching for a set of adjudicated facts that illustrates a violation
of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty, the law is still scratching its head. There
are no such cases; there is no such set of facts. As a result, section 36(b) has
not served its purpose, nor has it solved the problems for which it was
enacted.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

How did section 36(b)'s federally protected fiduciary duty and cause of
action arise? This section answers that question by reviewing section 36(b)'s
legislative history.32
28. See discussion infra Part III.
29. S.REP. No. 91-184, at 2 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4898.
30. Id.
31. Id. (italics added to foreshadow the irony inherent in the Senate Committee's stated
goal to ensure that section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty would set a clear standard and an effective
method to ensure that courts could hold investment advisers to account for breaching their
fiduciary duty, because no shareholder has ever proved a violation of section 36(b)).
32. See Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 493-510 (2010). In researching the
legislative history behind section 36(b), I cannot overstate how influential the Yeung-
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In 1935, Congress determined that hard-working Americans who entrust
their savings to investment companies deserve legal protection.33 Acting
under congressional direction, the SEC studied and filed a report on
investment companies, which led to the enactment of the ICA.34 The ICA
recognized that as assets under the management of investment companies
rise, the legal protection of investors must keep pace; to that end, additional
studies and reports were authorized.35 When legions of Americans entered
periods of prosperity and growth in the 1950s, Congress recognized that
mutual fund companies held significant assets of the investing public.36
Concerned that legal protections for ordinary investors were not keeping
pace with the rapid and massive growth enjoyed by mutual fund companies,
the SEC commissioned the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at
the University of Pennsylvania in 1958 to study investment'companies a7
This resulted in the famous 1962 Wharton Report.3"
The Wharton Report revealed that mutual fund clients did not have the
same bargaining power over fees as non-fund clients enjoyed, resulting in
fund clients paying more for investment advisory services than non-fund
clients. 9 In fact, it appeared that many investment advisers charged fees to
Freeman article was in guiding my path. Although I mainly cite to the principal documents
in discussing the legislative history, I give enormous credit to these authors for shining a
bright light on the path that led to the congressional enactment of section 36(b). See id. at
485 n.11 (explaining that because "a thorough examination of the legislative history under
section 36(b), in order to ascertain Congress's intent, [had] not been done[,]" their "article
fills 'that void."); id. at 493 n.58 (citing Gerard T. Manges, The Investment Company
Amendments Act of 1970, 26 Bus. LAW. 1311 (1971); Gerard H. Manges, The Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970-An Analysis and Appraisal After Two Years, 14 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 387 (1973); Walter P. North, A Brief History of Federal Investment
Company Legislation, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 677 (1969); Walter P. North, The Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 712 (1971); Alan W. Rottenberg,
Developing Limits on Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers, 7 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309
(1970); Robert N. Cowen, Note, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees and the New Standard of
FiduciaryDuty Interpretingthe 1970 Mutual Fund Act, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 627 (1971)).
33. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 3, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4899.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 3, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4899-900; see Yeung & Freeman,
supra note 18, at 494.
38. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 3, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4900 (citing Wharton Sch. of Fin. &
Com., A Study of Mut. Funds, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274 (1962)).
39. Wharton Sch. of Fin. & Com., Study of Mut. Funds, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, at 28-30
(1962) [hereinafter Wharton Report]; see Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 494; see also
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 537 (1984) (noting that the Wharton Report
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fund clients that were .2% of assets more than what they charged non-fund
clients.' In a dizzying display of stunning symmetry, it was discovered that
79.3% of funds were charged a flat fee while 79.3% of non-fund clients were
charged a scaled or negotiated fee. 4 The Wharton Report "questioned the
presence of arm's length negotiation" in the mutual fund context that could
lower fees, the way that fees were reduced for non-fund clients.42
The SEC also conducted a detailed study of the securities industry and
mutual funds.43 The SEC's 1966 Report on the Public Policy Implications of
Investment Company Growth mostly mirrored the findings of the Wharton
Report, concluding that investment advisers charged fund clients more than
non-fund clients.' This further indicated that fund clients did not enjoy
robust negotiating power over fees with investment advisers the way that
non-fund clients did. The SEC Report further revealed that shareholders of
funds internally managed by advisers paid nearly twice as much in fees for
services than fund shareholders in externally managed funds, again
demonstrating how the lack of bargaining power artificially increases fees
for investment services.45 The SEC also reported that because investment
"found that investment advisers often charged mutual funds higher fees than those charged
the advisers' other clients and further determined that the structure of the industry, even as
regulated by the [ICA], had proven resistant to efforts to moderate adviser compensation.")
(citing Wharton Sch. of Fin. & Com., Study of Mut. Funds, H.R. REP. No. 87-2274, at 28-30,
34, 66-67 (1962)).
40. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 494 nn.62-63; Wharton Report, supra note 39,
at 484, 489. If an investment adviser had $10,000,000,000 of assets under management with
$5,000,000,000 in non-fund accounts with a .3% fee and $5,000,000,000 in fund accounts
with a .5% fee, non-fund clients would pay $15,000,000 in fees in the first year while fund
clients would pay $25,000,000 in fees.
41. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 494 n.65; Wharton Report, supra note 39, at
480.
42. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 495; see also id. at 495 n.68 ("These findings
suggest that the special structural characteristics of this industry, with an external adviser
closely affiliated with the management of the mutual fund, tend to weaken the bargaining
position of the fund in the establishment of advisory fee rates. Other clients have effective
alternatives, and the rates charged them are more clearly influenced by the force of
competition.") (citing Wharton Sch. of Fin. & Com., Study of Mut. Funds, H.R. REP. No. 872274, 521 (1962)).
43. S.REP. No. 91-184, at 4, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4900 (citing Rep. of the SEC on the
Pub. Pol'y Implications of Inv. Co. Growth, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337 (1966)).
44. Rep. of the SEC on the Pub. Pol'y Implications of Inv. Co. Growth, H.R. REP. No.
89-2337, at 119-20 (1966) [hereinafter SEC Report]; S. REP. No. 91-184, at 1-2, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4897-98; Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 496.
45. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 496 n.77 (citing SEC Report, H.R. REP. No. 892337, at 103-04).
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advisers' fees were often based on a fixed percentage of the mutual fund's
assets-and not on the cost of actual services rendered-as those assets
grow, the fixed-percentage format could result in unreasonable fees due to
the fact that the adviser would realize economies of scale in managing larger
portfolios.46 The SEC concluded that fund advisers did not compete to
provide services to its funds, resulting in no "downward pressure on fee
pricing. '""' Compounding the problem was the fact that mutual funds were
similarly situated across the industry, such that a shareholder moving from
one fund to another would still lack sufficient bargaining power to lower
fees.4" If you think that fund shareholders should simply fire an investment
adviser who charges high fees, the SEC concluded that was not a viable,
realistic option because "[t]he adviser and its affidiates typically manage the
portfolio, distribute fund shares, provide all management, and maintain
control over a fund's books and records" such that "[t]he costs and
disruption that would accompany the replacement of an adviser 'make
termination of the existing advisory relationship a wholly unrealistic
alternative in negotiations over advisory fees."' 49
Engendering considerable controversy, the SEC proposed that because
there were no enforceable constraints on advisory fees, the ICA should be
amended so that all investment advisory fees would be subject to a standard
of reasonableness.5 0 Both the House and the Senate took up bills and held
hearings on the SEC's proposed fiduciary standard.5 '
The mutual fund industry vehemently denied and opposed many of the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Wharton Report and
SEC Report. 2 The industry countered that investors were sufficiently
protected through competition and existing law. 3
As the federal legislation moved forward, it became apparent that some
type of fiduciary duty was going to be enacted that would govern
investment advisers. As legislation was promoted and debated, the Senate

46. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 537 (1984) (citing SEC Report, H.R.
REP. No. 89-2337, at 89, 94, 102).
47. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 497 (citing SEC Report, H.R. REP.No. 89-2337,
at 126-27).
48. Id. at 496-97 (citing SEC Report, H.R. REp. No. 89-2337, at 126).
49. Id. at 498 n.95 (quoting SEC Report, H.R. REP.No. 89-2337, at 131).
50. Id. at 498, 500; SEC Report, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 144; see Investment Company
Amendments Act of 1967, S. 1659 § 8(d), H.R. 9510 § 8(d).
51. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 500; S.1659 § 8(d); H.R. 9510 § 8(d).
52. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 501.
53. Id. at 502.
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Committee took the lead on conducting hearings to amend the ICA.54 The
Senate's bill to amend the ICA sought to "update our nation's securities
laws so that they will be better suited for an ever-expanding investment
company industry.""5 In 1968, a Senate bill containing a reasonableness
standard was reported out of the Senate Committee, which specifically
highlighted how the unique structure of mutual funds created inherent
conflicts of interest that prohibited effective competition on price normally
accomplished through arm's-length bargaining.5 6 The Senate Committee
exhorted that this new fiduciary standard of reasonableness would "provide
a meaningful mechanism through which the management fee which may be
unreasonable can be effectively challenged" in federal court.57 Meaningful,
substantive debate took place over the pros and cons of the proposed
fiduciary duty, but the 1968 legislation failed to garner enough support.
While the earlier Senate bill would have restricted investment advisers to
charging only "reasonable" fees, this standard was eventually dropped in
favor of placing "a specific 'fiduciary duty' [on an investment adviser] in
respect to management fee compensation. 5 S8 When a bill emerged from the
Senate Committee, a newly created section 36(b) regulated investment
advisers by requiring them to comply with a "fiduciary duty with respect to
compensation for services or other payments paid by the fund or its
shareholders to the adviser."'5 9
In reaching a consensus on the newly created fiduciary duty standard,
the Senate -Committee recognized "that on the whole the investment
company industry reflects diligent management by competent persons" and
was "impressed by the value of the services that the investment company
industry has provided and can provide in the future to the many investors
who wish to put their savings in broadly diversified and professionally
managed securities portfolios." 60 Recognizing that "adequate compensation
and incentives" would attract people "of ability and integrity" to the mutual
fund industry, the Senate Committee nonetheless concluded that "investors

54. S. REP. No. 91-184, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897.
55. Id. at 2, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4898.
56. Yeung & Freeman, supranote 18, at 504; S. REP. No. 90-1351, at 5 (1968).
57. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 505 (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1351, at 5). Please
continue reading so that you, too, may conclude that these legislators were way off in their
predictive abilities!
58. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 5-6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4902.
59. Id. at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4902; Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 506.
60. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 4, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4900.
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should share equitably . . . in the economies available as a result of the
' 61
growth and general acceptance of mutual funds.

The Senate Committee then encapsulated the unique challenges
confronting mutual fund shareholders and the potential for abuse in the
fees charged for mutual fund services-the captive nature of advisers to
funds, the inherent conflicts of interest in how mutual funds are structured,
and the lack of normal market forces that allow arm's-length bargaining.62
The Senate Committee succinctly explained why the structure of
investment companies caused concern:
Mutual funds, with rare exception, are not operated by their own
employees. Most funds are formed, sold, and managed by
external organizations that are separately owned and operated.
These separate organizations are usually called investment
advisers. The advisers select the funds' investments and operate
their businesses. For these services they receive ... advisory fees.

These fees are usually calculated a[s] a percentage of the funds'
net assets ....
Because of the unique structure of this industry the relationship
between mutual funds and their investment adviser is not the
same as that usually existing between buyers and sellers or in
conventional corporate relationships. Since a typical fund is
organized by its investment adviser which provides it with
almost all management services and because its shares are
bought by investors who rely on that service, a mutual fund
cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the
adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm's-length bargaining do not
work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do
in other sectors of the American economy. 3
The Senate Committee explained that, historically, investment advisory fees
charged to mutual fund shareholders could only be challenged under state
61. Id. at 4,1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4901.
62. Id.
63. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 5, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4901. The Supreme Court has
recognized that in enacting section 36(b) to impose a fiduciary duty on investment advisers,
"Congress was concerned about the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of
investment companies." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979). The Supreme Court has
further recognized that given this unique aspect of how mutual funds are structured, "[tlhe
relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential

conflicts of interest." Id. at 481 (citing Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir.
1976)).
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law "corporate waste" standards, which required fees to "shock the
conscience. "64 Recognizing that this rule may be proper "when the
protections of arm's-length bargaining are present," it is "unduly
restrictive" when applied to "the mutual fund industry where . . .
6
marketplace forces are not likely to operate as effectively."
The Senate Committee clarified that adding a federally protected
fiduciary duty did not imply that investment advisers were not entitled to
make a profit or that advisers would have their rates regulated like public
utilities.66 The Senate Committee also cautioned that adding a fiduciary
duty did not mean "that the present industry level of management fees or
that the fee of any particular adviser is too high." 67 But the Senate
Committee did indicate that as the mutual fund industry enjoys dramatic
growth, the economies of scale enjoyed by advisers should be shared with
investors by reducing fees as funds grow.68 Tellingly, the Senate Committee
declared that "the best industry practice will provide a guide" as to how
economies of scale should be shared with investors. 69 The Senate
Committee declared that although courts would not be authorized to
substitute their business judgment on fees over boards of directors, the
.creation of a fiduciary duty on fees was meant to "provide a mechanism for
court enforcement of this duty."7 °
64. S.REP. No.91-184, at 5, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4901.
65. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that the SEC Report "concluded that lawsuits
by security holders challenging the reasonableness of adviser fees had been largely ineffective
due to the standards employed by courts to judge the fees." Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox,
464 U.S. 523, 537 (1984) (citing SEC Report, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 132-43). The Court
illustrated the difficulty that shareholders had faced in excessive fee cases before section
36(b) was enacted:
In the three cases cited by the SEC, the courts had evaluated the adviser
contracts according to common law standards of corporate waste, under which
an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the court deemed it
"unconscionable" or "shocking." Similarly, security holders challenging
adviser
fees under the [ICA] itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust.
Id. at 540 n.12 (citing SEC Report, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 142; Acampora v. Birkland, 220
F. Supp. 527, 548-49 (D. Colo. 1963); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962);
Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 170 A.2d 720, 723 (Del. Ch. 1961); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp.
207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967:
Hearings on S.1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
117-18 (1967)).
66. S.REP. No. 91-184, at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4902.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id. (emphasis added).
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The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce mostly
followed the. Senate Committee's lead. Finding that "arm's length
bargaining was not particularly effective in the fund industry," the House
Committee agreed that "'a change in the standard for testing management
fees is appropriate and needed.'..
The final bill passed the House and the Senate, and President Richard M.
Nixon signed the bill into law on December 14, 1970.72
Identifying an industry that lacks normal market constraints like
competition and arm's-length bargaining, Congress enacted a fiduciary
duty that courts could readily enforce to ensure that mutual fund investors
were not harmed by excessive fees. This Article asks whether Congress
successfully enacted a standard that can be consistently interpreted and
applied to ensure that society knows what fees are unlawful. Although the
legal standard that implements section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty is crystal clear
in its recitation, the ability to forecast unlawful behavior under the standard
is non-existent. To that end, there is no just and enforceable standard. The
following section highlights that no fund shareholder has proved in court
that an investment adviser breached its section 36(b) fiduciary duty.
IV. JUDICIAL HISTORY

Mutual fund shareholders have endured a long quest to prove that an
investment adviser has extracted unlawful fees from them. Like Frodo from
the Lord of the Rings, it seems like the shareholders' quest is unending
without the possibility of victory." Like Frodo's burden of the ring, fund
shareholders have borne the heavy burden of fees without a judicial victory.
A. Pro-corporationState Law
Before section 36(b)'s federally protected fiduciary duty and cause of
action were created in 1970, mutual fund shareholders were stuck in state
courts when trying to plead and prove that investment advisers charged
excessive fees. 74 Two pro-corporation theories-the business judgment rule
and shareholder ratification-often stood in the way of shareholder
success. 75 The business judgment rule mostly insulated corporate boards
71.

Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 509 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, at 7).

72. Id. at 510; 116CONG. REC. 41,623 (1970).
73. See generallyJ.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING (Del Ray Mass Market ed.
2012).

74. Yeung & Freeman, supra note 18, at 486.
75. Id. at 486-87.
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from judicial review of their fee determinations, while shareholder
ratification of board decisions created a heavy burden to prove corporate
waste.76 To meet this latter burden, a fund shareholder was required to
prove that "what the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that
no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what
the corporation has paid"; the failure to meet this standard resulted in the
dismissal of the shareholder's complaint.77 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
the United States succinctly described the predicament in which investors
found themselves when trying to prove state-law claims of excessive fees:
the [SEC] concluded that the [ICA]'s provisions for independent
directors and approval of adviser contracts had actually
frustrated effective challenges to adviser fees. In particular, the
[SEC] noted that in the three fully litigated cases in which
security holders had attacked such fees under state law, the
courts had relied on the approval of adviser contracts by security
holders or unaffiliated directors to uphold the fees.7"
With the creation of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty and a private cause of
action, shareholder litigation against investment advisers over excessive fees
mostly abandoned state courts in favor of federal courts. Given the newly
created, federally protected fiduciary duty, a new legal standard was needed
to analyze excessive-fee claims.
B. FederalCourts' Interpretationof Section 36(b)s FiduciaryDuty
Twelve years after Congress enacted section 36(b), in 1982, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its seminal decision
interpreting section 36(b) in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc.7" For the past three decades, this seminal case has guided
courts' analyses of section 36(b) cases by providing the analytical
framework in the form of the Gartenberg standard and the Gartenberg

76. Id.
77. Id. at 487-88 (relying on a trio of state-law cases that showcased how difficult it was
to prove corporate waste in the shareholder context under state law) (citing Saxe v. Brady,
184 A.2d 602, 604, 610, 613 (Del. Ch. 1962); Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 548-49
(D. Colo. 1963); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 170 A.2d 720, 723 (Del. Ch. 1961)).
78. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 540 (1984) (citing SEC Report, H.R.
REP. No. 89-2337, at 132-43 (1966)).
79. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).

20151

JUDGENOT UNDER AN UNJUSTSTANDARD

factors.8 The Gartenbergstandard simply states that to prove a violation of
section 36(b), a shareholder must show that "the adviser-manager [charged]
a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of
1 The Gartenbergcourt developed factors to apply
arm's-length bargaining.""
to the facts of a case to determine whether the standard of liability had been
met. These factors became known as the Gartenbergfactors, and here is a
list of them:
(a) the nature and quality of services provided to fund
shareholders; (b) the profitability of the fund to the advisermanager; (c) fall-out benefits; (d) economies of scale; (e)
comparative fee structures; and (f) the independence and
conscientiousness of the trustees.82

80. It might be interesting to note that there were two named plaintiffs in the
Gartenberg case-Irving L. Gartenberg and Simone C. Andre. Id. at 923. The first named
plaintiff-Gartenberg-has enjoyed the fortune (or misfortune) of having a seminal
decision, a legal standard, and legal factors named after him. If the named plaintiffs had been
reversed on the caption, however, then courts would have referenced and applied the Andre
standard and the Andre factors versus the Gartenberg standard and the Gartenberg factors.
Chance led to the Gartenberg versus Andre standard, which reminds me of a funny story
told by Tommy John, a former professional baseball player. Tommy John had a groundbreaking, career-saving operation called ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction to his
pitching arm; that revolutionary surgery is now famously referred to as "Tommy John
Surgery." See Dan Patrick, Just My Type: Tommy John, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 26, 2014;
.Matt McCarthy, Tommy John Surgery, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 8, 2014 (explaining that
"Tommy John surgery" is "named after the Dodgers lefty who underwent the first UCL
reconstruction, in 1974."). Every pitcher since Tommy John who has undergone the same
operation is now referred to as having had Tommy John Surgery. See McCarthy, supra
(stating that, on average, more than sixteen major league pitchers underwent Tommy John
Surgery between 2000 and 2011, thirty-six had it in 2012, and twenty-six pitchers currently
in the major leagues have had the surgery). Tommy John has explained that he has had no
bad feelings in having had the surgery named after him and not after Brent Strom, the
second person to have had the surgery. See Patrick, supra.Tommy John also has told a funny
story about how Coach Tommy LaSorda of the Los Angeles Dodgers was thankful that
Tommy John was the first to have the surgery: "Thank God it wasn't [infielder] Billy
Grabarkewitz who had it first. Who would want to say that?" Id. So instead of regaling about
the Billy Grabarkewitz surgery, we reference the Tommy John surgery, and in lieu of the
Andre standard, courts have used the Gartenberg standard.
81. Gartenberg,694 F.2d at 928 (emphasis added).
82. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing
Gartenberg,694 F.2d at 929-30); see Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 821 (8th
Cir. 2009) (citing Gartenberg,694 F.2d at 928-31).
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You can think of the factors as analytical tools that unlock the actual legal
standard. When the factors are used to analyze the facts of actual cases, the
decision on whether the underlying standard has been violated should
become clearer. A violation of the legal standard likewise results in a legal
conclusion that an investment adviser breached its section 36(b) fiduciary
duty with respect to the receipt of compensation.
Thirty-three years after Gartenberg,every federal court that has applied
the Gartenbergstandard and the Gartenbergfactors has concluded that fund
shareholders failed to prove that an investment adviser breached its section
36(b) fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation.
Apparently, investment advisers operating under a federally protected
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation in managing
trillions of dollars belonging to hundreds of millions of Americans have
been squeaky clean and without fault for decades. In the next section, this
Article discusses the pivotal cases in section 36(b) litigation.
1. Second Circuit Creates Seminal GartenbergStandard and Factors
There is no better place to start than with the facts of the seminal
Gartenberg case. 3 In Gartenberg, two fund shareholders of the Merrill
Lynch Ready Assets Trust sued the investment adviser who managed the
mutual fund for violating its section 36(b) fiduciary duty in charging
excessive fees for giving investment advice and operating the fund. 4 The
mutual fund at issue was a common money market fund, in which the
manager invested shareholders' funds in short-term money market
securities with the goal to provide income, preserve capital, and maintain
liquidity. 5 In essence, this type of fund acts more like a bank account than a
traditional mutual fund that invests in marketable securities.8 6 In just four
years with investors flocking to the fund, the fund grew from $288 million
to over $19 billion.8 7 The investment adviser provided all of the necessary
services-office space, staff, portfolio management, recordkeeping,
reporting, correspondence, etc.-to the fund and its shareholders. a The
fund performed "reasonably well," producing "slightly above the average"
83. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 925-27, 930-34, n.4. This Article recounts the facts as
described by the Second Circuit. For a more detailed recitation of the facts, please review the
trial court's decision. See Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038,
1040-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
84. Gartenberg,694 F.2d at 925.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 926.

88. Id.
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returns when compared with similar funds.8 9 For these services, the adviser
charged a fee based on the fund's net assets. 90 When fund assets remained
under $500 million, the fund paid a .5% fee, and as fund assets grew, the
fixed percentage gradually decreased, to the point that when fund assets
exceeded $2.5 billion, the fee was .275%." This staggered-fee schedule
resulted in an effective rate of .288%.92
The district court held a bench trial on the section 36(b) claims, after
which it dismissed the fund shareholders' suit for failing to prove that the
fees were so disproportionately large to constitute a breach of the fiduciary
duty.93 The district court concluded that the adviser's services were
extensive, valuable, and unavailable to other funds.94
On appeal, the fund shareholders' chief argument was that the fee
percentage that may have been lawful when the fund was new became
excessive when the fund rapidly grew into a multi-billion dollar fund.95
Essentially, the fund shareholders argued that unless the fund's expenses
actually increased at the same rate as the assets under management-an
almost-impossible proposition given the economies of scale-then the fee
percentage should drop significantly as assets rise. This theme is commonly
known as forcing the investment adviser to share the economies of scale
with the fund shareholders.
Acknowledging the lack of competition among investment advisers, the
Second Circuit promptly rejected the district court's assertion that a key
factor is to compare industry fees:
We disagree with the district court's suggestions that the
principal factor to be considered in evaluating a fee's fairness is
the price charged by other similar advisers to funds managed by
them, that the "price charged by advisers to those funds
establishes the free and open market level for fiduciary
compensation," that the "market price.., serves as a standard to
test the fairness of the investment advisory fee," and that a fee is
fair if it "is in harmony with the broad and prevailing market
choice available to the investor." Competition between money
market funds for shareholder business does not support an
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 928.
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inference that competition must therefore also exist between
adviser-managers for fund business. The former may be vigorous
even though the latter is virtually non-existent. Each is governed
by different forces. Reliance on prevailing industry advisory fees
will not satisfy § 36(b).96
The court noted that fees extracted by advisers from similar funds could be
taken into account. The relevance of such evidentiary comparisons
probably does not tend to support higher fees, however, but rather tends to
show that as one adviser reduces its fees as its fund grows, this reduction in
fees should probably serve as a best practice in the industry. 97
Notwithstanding such a utopian vision, most funds exist within "an
unseverable relationship" with the adviser, a common fact that "tends to
weaken the weight to be given to rates charged by advisers of other similar
funds."9 Because it is not easy for a fund to change advisers, a hallmark of
competition is lacking, which leads to the unfortunate conclusion that
"investment advisers seldom, if ever, compete with each other for advisory
' The Second Circuit also recognized that
contracts with mutual funds."99
shareholders fend not to even seek competition between advisers based on
fees, particularly because the actual fee charged to each shareholder, as
opposed to the fund, might seem relatively insignificant.10 '
Given "the potentially incestuous relationships between many advisers
and their funds," the court recognized that Congress determined that other
factors might be more important when analyzing whether an investment
adviser charged an excessive fee to constitute a breach of its fiduciary
duty.' The court recognized that relevant factors include "the adviser[]'s
cost in providing the service, the nature and quality of the service, the extent
to which the adviser[] realizes economies of scale as the fund grows larger,
10 2
and the volume of orders which must be processed by the manager."
Rounding out the list, the court also identified as relevant factors "the
expertise of the independent trustees of a fund, whether they are fully
informed about all facts bearing on the adviser[]'s service and fee, and the
extent of care and conscientiousness with which they perform their
96. Id. at 929 (emphasis added) (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
528 F. Supp. 1038, 1049,1067-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982)).
97. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-184, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4902).
98. Id. (citing SEC Report, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 131, 148).
99. Id. (citing SEC Report, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337, at 126).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 929-30.
102. Id. at 930.
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duties." °3 The court cautioned that "even if the trustees of a fund
endeavored to act in a responsible fashion, an adviser[]'s fee could
[nevertheless] be so disproportionately large as to amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty in violation of § 36(b)."" °
After defining the governing legal standard and laying out the analytical
factors, the court applied the law to the facts of the case to conclude-as all
courts have done for decades-that fund shareholders had failed to meet
their burden to prove that the investment adviser charged an excessive fee
in breach of its section 36(b) fiduciary duty." 5 To properly analyze an
excessive-fee case, the law requires a comparison between the services
rendered and the fees charged. Following that approach, the Second Circuit
recognized that on the services side of the analytical ledger, the investment
adviser had provided "the highest quality" of services and "better-thanaverage return[s]." 06 The court then moved on to a consideration of the
fees charged, instantly recognizing that the fees dramatically increased from
$1.5 million to nearly $40 million in four years as the fund's size exploded
"from $428 million to over $19 billion."0 7 Even though the fees increased
dramatically, the court realized that the services provided also increased due
to a greater number of customers, increased daily transactions, and a
tripling of orders that needed to be processed.' In response, the court
explained, the adviser's "rate was graduated downward to reflect the
economies [of scale] that might be realized from the increase in the value of
10 9
the [fund's] net assets.'

One sticking point that the court considered, however, was the fund
shareholders' claim that the investment adviser had failed to consider fallout and float benefits."0 The adviser had, through a subsidiary, "gained
large 'fall-out' financial benefits annually in the form of commissions on
non-Fund securities business generated by Fund customers and interest
income on funds (known as the 'float') held by the [subsidiary] from the
date when a redemption check is issued by the Fund to its customer until
the date it clears.""' Fund shareholders contended that the adviser's failure
103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 930-32.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 932.
Id.
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to offer a "very substantial offset" for these benefits against the fees charged
breached its section 36(b) fiduciary duty."2 Notwithstanding its recognition
that fall-out benefits are a relevant factor and that this argument was a
"serious problem," the court held that fund shareholders failed to prove that
these fall-out "benefits were so substantial that they rendered the [adviser]'s
fee so disproportionately large."' 13
Somewhat ironically, in its penultimate paragraph, the Second Circuit
seemingly signaled that the fund shareholders actually could have prevailed
had they provided more probative evidence on either services or fees:
Our affirmance is not a holding that the fee[s are] fair and
reasonable. We merely conclude that on this record
[shareholders] failed to prove .. . . a breach of fiduciary duty.

Whether a violation of § 36(b) might be established through
more probative evidence of (1) the ... processing costs, (2) the
offsetting commission benefits realized . . . from non-Fund

securities business generated by Fund accounts, and (3) the
"float" interest income gained.., from [the] method of handling
payment on Fund redemptions, must therefore remain a matter
of speculation." 4
Although the court held that the investment adviser had not breached its
fiduciary duty, it is interesting to note that the court nevertheless advised
the fund's independent trustees to study the fees and services, as outlined in
the opinion."'
By and large, the Gartenberg standard and factors have been applied by
116
all federal courts for decades without a single shareholder winning a case.
Nearly three decades later, however, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
entered the fray in decidedly different ways.
2. Seventh Circuit Cuts a Free-Market Path with Minimal Judicial
Review
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in Jones v. Harris
Associates L.P.," 7 which took a dramatically different analytical path than

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 933.
Id.
See infra notes 294-96.
527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
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had the Second Circuit in Gartenberg."8 In Jones, fund shareholders
brought a section 36(b) claim against an investment adviser that charged its
fund "1% (per year) of the first $2 billion of the fund's assets, 0.9% of the
next $1 billion, 0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 0.75% of anything over $5
120
billion."" 9 As the fund grew, so did the investment adviser's fees.
Concluding that the investment adviser had not violated its fiduciary2 duty,
the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the case.' 1
Arguing on appeal that the district court erroneously concluded that the
advisory fees were not excessive, fund shareholders focused on the lack of
competition to set fees and the preferential treatment on fees that
investment advisers gave to institutional, non-fund clients over fund
clients. 22 Fund shareholders insisted that fund "fees are set incestuously
rather than by competition," because investment advisers create the funds
and the funds rarely change advisers. 23 Fund shareholders also stressed that
while the captive funds were being charged the rates laid out above, the
investment adviser's "institutional clients (such as pension funds)" paid
considerably less in fees; for example, one such client was charged only
.75% of the first $15 million and .35% of amounts over $500 million, with
intermediate breakpoints. 4 Fund shareholders boldly argued "that a

118. Writing for the court, Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook sounded more like a novice
economist than a federal judge trying to faithfully interpret and apply the law. See id. at 63334. For some of Chief Judge Easterbrook's work in law and economics, see Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term: Forward The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2005).

119. Jones, 527 F.3d at 631.
120. Id. at 629.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 631.
123. Id.
124. Id. Just doing a little back-of-the-envelope calculation, which the Seventh Circuit
apparently deemed entirely irrelevant, one can see that fund shareholders pay drastically
higher fees for advisory services than do institutional clients for the same amount of invested
capital. Fund shareholders pay a fee totaling 1% of the first $2 billion of fund assets, while
institutional clients pay only .75% of the first $15 million' and .35% of amounts over $500
million. If the investment adviser advised a $2 billion captive, retail mutual fund and a $2
billion free-market institutional account, the adviser would extract an annual fee from the
fund of $20 million, while it would charge its institutional client a much smaller fee of
$7,060,000 for managing the same amount of money. Use your imagination to determine
how those fees would pile up year after year and decade after decade. Fees matter, and
competition and hard bargaining set the fees.
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fiduciary may charge its controlled clients no more than its independent
clients." 2 '
Setting a tone that fund shareholders have little federal protection in
trying to prove that their investment adviser charged excessive fees, the
Seventh Circuit quickly dispensed with the Gartenbergstandard "because it
relies too little on markets.' ' 2 6 Without much effort to even cite to

authority, the court proclaimed the virtues of competition that set advisory
fees in the mutual fund industry in ways that comply with section 36(b)'s
fiduciary duty. 2 7 Cautioning that a federally recognized "fiduciary duty
differs from rate regulation," the Seventh Circuit announced a radically
different test than the Second Circuit's Gartenbergstandard: "[a] fiduciary
must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on
compensation. "128
Attempting to extract courts from determining whether fees are
excessive, the court explained that a fund's "trustees (and in the end
investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury,
determine how much advisory services are, worth." 29 Building upon its
flurry of free-market principles that work best without judicial oversight,
the court declared that even though "[clompetitive processes are imperfect,"
they "remain superior to a 'just price' system administered by the judiciary,"
because no matter how "weak competition may be at weeding out errors,
the judicial process is worse." 3 ' To complete its point by setting up and
then attacking strawmen, the court insisted that "[jiudicial price-setting
does not accompany fiduciary duties" and that "section 36(b) does not
create a rate-regulation mechanism." 3 '
Once the court interpreted section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty by creating a
relaxed standard with little judicial oversight of the fees that investment
advisers charge to fund shareholders, the court opined that the mutual fund
industry actually overflows with competition such that judicial oversight
would cause more harm than good. 32 Finally, the court explained why it
125. Id.
126. Id. at 632.
127. Id. at 631-35.
128. Id. at 632.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 632-33.
131. Id. at 633.
132. Id. at 633-35. Regardless of Congress's intent in enacting a federally protected right
and cause of action to protect fund shareholders from investment advisers who breach their
fiduciary duties with respect to fees, the court prophesied "that regulating advisory fees
through litigation is unlikely to do more good than harm." Id. at 634 (citing John C. Coates

20151

JUDGENOT UNDER AN UNJUST STANDARD

sanctioned the investment adviser's charging dramatically reduced fees to
institutional clients than it charged fund clients:
[The adviser] charges a lower percentage of assets to other
clients, but this does not imply that it must be charging too much
to the [mutual] funds. Different clients call for different
commitments of time. Pension funds have low (and predictable)
turnover of assets. Mutual funds may grow or shrink quickly and
must hold some assets in high-liquidity instruments to facilitate
redemptions. That complicates an adviser's task. Joint costs
likewise make it hard to draw inferences from fee levels. Some
tasks in research, valuation, and portfolio design will have
benefits for several clients. In competition those joint costs are
apportioned among paying customers according to their
elasticity of demand, not according to any rule of equal
treatment.
Federal securities laws [like the ICA] work largely by requiring
disclosure and then allowing price to be set by competition in
which investors make their own choices. [Fund shareholders] do
not contend that [the investment's adviser] pulled the wool over
the eyes of the disinterested trustees or otherwise hindered their
ability to negotiate a favorable price for advisory services. The
fees are not hidden from investors-and the.., funds' net return
has attracted new investment rather than driving investors away.
As § 36(b) does not make the federal judiciary a rate regulator,
after the fashion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
the judgment of the district court is affirmed."'
And that was that, or so it seemed. The Seventh Circuit's newly minted freemarket standard for interpreting section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty would lose
its luster in short order.
3. Dissenting Opinion from the Seventh Circuit's New Path
The losing shareholders petitioned for rehearing and for rehearing en
banc, which the court denied."' Judge Richard A. Posner, an equally
ambitious supporter of a law-and-economics approach to judging as Judge

& R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications
for Policy, 33 IowA J. CoRP. L. 151 (2007)).
133. Id. at 634-35.
134. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Easterbrook, 35 diverged from free-market orthodoxy in how he would have
decided this case. Judge Posner issued a dissenting opinion from the court's
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.'36 In it, he takes his court to task
for unnecessarily creating a circuit split on a critical issue to the mutual
fund industry by being the lone objector to the Gartenberg standard.'3 7
Judge Posner facetiously questioned the necessity to relax the legal standard
that protects fund shareholders under section 36(b):
It's not as if Gartenberg has proved to be too hard on fund
advisers.... [L]itigation in excessive fee cases has resulted almost
uniformly in judgments for the defendants . . .although there

have been some notable settlements wherein defendants have
13
agreed to prospective reduction in the fee schedule.
Judge Posner disagreed with Judge Easterbrook's reliance on his own
"economic analysis," deeming it "ripe for reexamination."

39

Recognizing

135. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow, Economic Analysis in Judicial Decision Making-An
Assessment Based on Judge Posner's Tax Decisions, 25 VA. TAX REv. 67, 69 (2005); see also
Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract

Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014).
136. Jones, 537 F.3d at 729-33 (four judges joined in dissent).
137. Id. at 729; see id. at 732-33 ("[Our Court's decision in] Jones is the only appellate
opinion noted in Westlaw as disagreeing with Gartenberg; there is a slew of positive
citations.") (citing Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326-27 (4th Cir.
2001); In re Salomon Smith Barney Mut. Fund Fees Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336-37
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Minn. 2007);
Sins v. Janus Capital Mgmt., No. 04-cv-06147, LLC, 2006 WL 3746130, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec.
15, 2006); Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 WL 2355411, at *15-16
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006); Hunt v. Invesco Funds Grp., Inc., No. 04-02555, 2006 WL
1581846, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006); Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358, 373-74 (D.
Mass. 2005); Becherer v. Burt, No. 01-CV-00912DRH, 2003 WL 24260305, at *2 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 6, 2003); Millenco L.P. v. MEVC Advisors, Inc., No. CIV. 02-142-JJF, 2002 WL
31051604, at *3(D.Del. Aug. 21, 2002)).
138. Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (quoting JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1211 (3d ed. 2001)) (citing James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund
Expense Disclosures:A BehavioralPerspective,83 WASH. U.L.Q. 907, 923 (2005)).
139. Id. Such examination, as it were, might sadly reveal that many retail investors simply
do not understand or appreciate how high fees derail their investment plans: "Most workers,
despite best efforts by federal regulators and others, seemingly don't know or care how much
they are paying in fees for their 401(k) or similar retirement plan. But they and you should.
That's because paying high fees for your 401(k) likely reduces your overall investment
returns, and ultimately the overall size of your nest egg." Robert Powell, 9 Things You Need
to KnowAbout 401(k) Fees, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2014), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/9things-you-need-to-know-about-401k-fees-2014-07-08. Laurie Rowley, the co-founder of
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rampant abuse in the financial services industry, which includes the mutual
fund industry, Judge Posner disagreed with the court's blind reliance on
competition to protect fund shareholders, declaring that "[ciompetition in
product and capital markets can't be counted on to solve the problem" of
excessive compensation.4°

Cutting to the chase, Judge Posner wrote, "A particular concern in this
case is the adviser's charging its captive funds more than twice what it
charges independent funds."''
Judge Posner dismissed the court's
justification of this disparity in fees, asserting that the court's "suggestions
are offered purely as speculation, rather than anything having an
evidentiary or empirical basis."'42 Declaring that fund shareholders "are
indeed captive" of the investment adviser, Judge Posner took direct aim at
the court's assertion that competition would cure all ills regardless of any
notion that the funds are captive:
[T]he chief reason for substantial advisory fee level differences
between equity pension fund portfolio managers and equity
mutual fund portfolio managers is that advisory fees in the
pension field are subject to a marketplace where arm's-length
bargaining occurs. As a rule, [mutual] fund shareholders neither
benefit from arm's-length bargaining nor from prices that
approximate those that arm's-length bargaining would yield
were it the norm.

43

Judge Posner also criticized the court's contention that competition among
funds tamps down fees by explaining that "[t]he governance structure that
enables mutual fund advisers to charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so
the [court]'s comparability approach would if widely followed allow those
fees to become the industry's floor."' ' Judge Posner maintained that courts
must compare fees that an investment adviser "charges independent funds
with the much higher fees that it charges the funds it controls."'45 Judge
Posner complained that the court rejected the appropriate, "alternative
the National Association of Retirement Plan Participants, explained, "Millions of working
Americans have no idea how much they are paying [,even though] understanding how
much you are paying in fees is a critical step to financial security." Id.
140. Jones, 537 F.3d at 730-31.
141.

Id.at731.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 731-32 (quoting John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CoRp. L. 609, 634 (2001) (alteration in original)).
144. Id. at 732.
145. Id.
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comparison ... on the basis of airy speculation."14 6 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit soon rejected the Seventh Circuit's
approach, mostly lining up behind Gartenbergand Judge Posner's decision.
4. Shareholders Gain Rare Victory in the Eighth Circuit
Following the divided Seventh Circuit's rejection of the Gartenberg
standard, the Eighth Circuit took up the issue of the, appropriate legal
standard to enforce section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty. In Gallus v. Ameriprise
Financial, Inc.,'47 fund shareholders sued their investment adviser for
breach of fiduciary duty, claiming "(1) the fee negotiation was inherently
flawed because it was based not on [the adviser]'s costs and profits but on
external factors-namely the fee agreements of similar mutual funds in the
market; (2) [the adviser] provided comparable advisory services to
institutional, non-fiduciary clients at substantially lower fees than it charged
the [fund shareholders], to whom it owed a fiduciary duty; and (3) [the
adviser] misled the Board about its arrangements with non-fiduciary clients
to prevent the Board from questioning the higher fees demanded by [the
adviser].""4 One glaringfact was that the fund shareholderspaid an advisory
fee that was nearly twice as high as thefee paid by institutionalclients. 49 An
expert testified "that the advisory service provided to the mutual funds was
similar, if not identical, to the service [the adviser] provided to its
institutional clients." 5 ° Testimony for the adviser explained that the
difference in fees was the result of the fund's requiring additional services."'
A seeming smoking gun piece of evidence was produced in the form of an
internal e-mail message showing that the adviser knew about the disparity
in fees charged to institutional clients versus fund clients.'52 The e-mail
message stated that this fee-disparity issue "could come up in a Board
meeting" and that "we should have a reply, though it may or may not be
convincing. '

146. Id. Finally, Judge Posner recognized that although the court had created the wrong
standard in rejecting the Gartenberg standard, "[t]he outcome of this case may be correct."
Id.
147. 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009).
148. Id. at 818.
149. Id. at 819.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Jt. App. at 616).
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Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the
inherent structure of mutual funds interferes with normal market
conditions that promote competition and drive down costs." 4 The court
acknowledged the captive nature of most mutual funds, explaining that
"[a]lthough mutual funds are technically owned by the individual
shareholders who invest in the funds, most mutual funds are created,
organized, and managed by external investment advisers-an arrangement
that gives the adviser a significant amount of control over the fund it
serves." l"' Unwilling to follow the Seventh Circuit's lead in blindly believing
that free-market competition ensures that investment advisers will not
breach their federally mandated fiduciary duty, the Eighth Circuit at least
considered the other side of the debate:
Experts have extensively debated the extent to which these
industry characteristics interfere with robust competition and
drive up fees. [S]tudies have concluded that inherent conflicts of
interest and a lack of meaningful competition between mutual
funds have led to systematic overpricing of investment advice. 56
The Eighth Circuit fully understood and appreciated the shareholders'
central argument:
[A]rm's-length bargaining does not occur between an adviser
and a mutual fund because the fund cannot sever its relationship
with the adviser. Critics claim that because this dynamic
pervades the mutual fund industry, there is little competitive
pressure to lower fees. This phenomenon may be exacerbated by
the fact that the typical fee structure-which is established as a
percentage of net asset value-will allow an adviser's
compensation to skyrocket if the fee is not adjusted downward as
a fund grows larger.'57
154. Id. at 820.
155. Id. One member of two mutual fund boards of directors has explained, "And if you
are not independent of the management company, the notion that you can act effectively in
an arm's-length bargaining capacity, vis-a-vis the management company, is silly." Ryan
Bollman & Mark Andreu, Note, Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.: The Search for Investor
ProtectionContinues, 65 U. MIAMI L. REv. 717, 724 & n.50 (quoting Kenneth E. Scott, What
Role Is There for Independent Directors of Mutual Funds?. 2 VILL. J.L. & INV. MGMT. 1, 4

(2000)).
156. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 820.
157. Id. at 820-21. Writing for the Wall Street Journal recently, Chuck Jaffe eulogized Geoff
Bobroff, a man with over four decades of experience in the mutual fund industry in such
positions as trial attorney with the SEC in which he brought enforcement actions against

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:469

The Eighth Circuit then analyzed the Gartenberg standard and the
Gartenberg factors to determine whether this longstanding analytical
framework was consistent with section 36(b)'s text and purpose. 5 The
court noted that many courts had approved and applied the Gartenberg
framework, while only a divided Seventh Circuit in Jones had eschewed it.' 59
The Eighth Circuit confirmed that the Second Circuit's opinion in
Gartenbergprovides "a useful framework for resolving claims of excessive
fees, notwithstanding the substantial changes in the mutual fund industry
that have occurred in the intervening" time since Gartenbergwas decided in
1982. 160
Importantly, the Eighth Circuit recognized what I am arguing in this
Article-law is worthless without facts and facts are worthless without law.
Specifically, the court explained, "Fund advisers do not have a fiduciary duty
in merely an abstractsense.' 6' Although the court adopted the Gartenberg
standard, it cautioned that the standard must be applied appropriately:
But the [Gartenberg] standard . . . should not be construed to

create a safe harbor of exorbitance, for under such a view an
adviser's fiduciary duty would be diluted to a simple and easily
satisfiable requirement not to charge a fee that is egregiously out
of line with industry norms. To apply Gartenbergin this fashion
investment firms, employee at financial-services companies, founder of an investment consulting
firm, and board member of investment advisers. Chuck Jaffe, The Mutual Fund Industry Is a
Little Worse Off Today, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2014), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/theNoting the importance of
mutual-fund-industry-has-lost-a-voice-of-reason-2014-07-23.
Bobroff's advice to mutual fund investors, Jaffe reported that Bobroff taught "that if you are not a
sharp investor, savvy enough to handle it yourself and with sufficient dollars to build a diversified
portfolio without using mutual funds, then the fund world was a necessary evil." Id. But Jaffe
explained that Bobroff "was openly critical of boards with little independence and close ties to
management, the kind where a manager's contract gets rubber-stamped year after year despite
reviews which couldn't possibly ignore problems with underperformance," noting "just how
hard it can be for directors to remove a fund manager." Id. Jaffe explained that Bobroff cautioned
investors about fees: "Fund firms are very interested in your money-or at least the cut they get
for managing it-but they are more interested in their own.... [If] you could wonder whether a
fund's actions have your best interest at heart, you could assume they didn't." Id.
158. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 821-23.
159. Id. at 821-22 (citing Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 305 F.3d 140 (3d
Cir. 2002); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001); Forsythe v. Sun
Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass. 2006); Sins v. Janus Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 2006
WL 3746130 (D. Colo. 2006); In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D.
Pa. 2005); Zucker v. AIM Advisors, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 845 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Strigliabotti v.
Franklin Res., Inc., 2005 WL 645529 (N.D. Cal. 2005)).
160. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 822.
161. Id. at 822-23 (emphasis added).
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across the entire mutual fund market would be to eviscerate §
36(b). 62
Following through with its admonition against having a merely abstract
understanding of the law, the court postulated that the failure to understand
how to apply the Gartenberg framework properly "may explain why no
plaintiff has ever obtained a judgment in an action brought under that
provision.' 63 One key additional requirement to the proper application of
the Gartenbergframework, the court explained, is that courts must analyze
"both the adviser's conduct during negotiation and the end result."" 64
Reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the investment
adviser, the court held that the district court's analytical error was not in
applying the Gartenbergframework "for the limited purpose of determining
whether the fee itself constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, [but] it erred in
rejecting a comparison between the fees charged to [the adviser]'s
institutional clients and its mutual fund clients."'16' The court validated the
shareholder's argument to compare fund fees with institutional account
fees, characterizing it as "particularly strong in this case because the
investment advice may have been essentially the same for both accounts." 66
Along those lines, the court alerted investment advisers and courts that
"tethering fees to an industry median will not provide sure-fire protection
from § 36(b) liability." 67 Notably, the court agreed with the frequently aired
concern that the judiciary should not become rate-setters in the mutual
fund industry by substituting its judgment for the boards tasked with
6
setting fees. 1
The Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment against the
fund shareholders, making it appear as though the shareholders would have
a chance to prove at trial that their investment adviser had breached its
fiduciary duty as to fees. Any semblance of victory, however, was short162. Id.at 823.
163. Id. at 823 & n.4 (citing Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director "Independence
Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REv. 497, 519
(2008) (noting that no investor has obtained a verdict against an investment adviser in the
twenty-five years since Gartenberg)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 824; see Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner,
J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (cautioning that "(a] particular
concern in this case is the adviser's charging its captive funds more than twice what it
charges independent funds.").
167. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 824.
168. Id.
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lived. The Supreme Court of the United States later vacated the Eighth
Circuit's Gallus decision and remanded the case for further consideration in
light of Jones, a case discussed shortly.1 69 Upon remand, the district court
that had originally dismissed the shareholders' claims once again granted
summary judgment for the investment advisers. 7 In light of Jones, the
Eighth Circuit capitulated on the second appeal, affirming the dismissal. 7 '
5. Supreme Court Enters the Fray, Confirms GartenbergGenerally
And so stood the section 36(b) landscape in the spring of 2009. The last
word on section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty standard did not, however, come
from the Second Circuit, Seventh Circuit, or Eighth Circuit. In 2010, the
Supreme Court entered the fray to answer "what a mutual fund shareholder
must prove in order to show that a mutual fund investment adviser
breached" its section 36(b) fiduciary duty. 7 2 In Jones v. Harris Associates
L.P., the Court generally adopted the Gartenberganalytical framework.'73
But the Court perpetuated the long-standing problem that the framework is
purely theoretical and illusory. There continues to be no practical,
adjudicated illustration of how fund shareholders can prove a violation of
section 36(b).
a.

Oral arguments focus on governing standard and its
application

Before explaining the Court's decision in Jones, it is prudent to review the
transcript of oral argument. Although arguments probably do not reveal
exactly what individual justices are personally thinking, this exercise reveals
how the justices openly struggled with understanding the governing legal
standard that protects section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty and, more importantly,
in knowing how to apply that standard in an actual case.'74
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy openly struggled to determine what
Congress intended by placing a fiduciary duty as to fees on investment
advisers.' So, too, did Justice John Paul Stevens.' 76 Both justices were

169. Ameriprise Fin., Inc. v. Gallus, 559 U.S. 1046 (2010).
170. Gallus v. Am. Express Fin. Corp., No. 04-4498 (DWF/SRN), 2010 WL 5137419 (D.
Minn., Dec. 10, 2010).
171. Gallus v. Amerprise Fin., Inc., 675 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 2012).
172. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010).
173. Id. at 353.
174. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010) (No.
08-586).
175. Id. at 4-6, 11, 18-19:
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trying to determine how significant the fiduciary duty is. This entire debate
harkens back to the most famous words ever written about the fiduciary
duty standard. While a justice on the Court of Appeals of New York, Justice
Benjamin N. Cardozo famously set an extremely high standard of care for
fiduciaries under trust law:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standardof behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions.
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a

Is [the investment adviser] a fiduciary in the same sense as a corporate officer
and a corporate director? Or does his fiduciary duty differ? Is it higher or lower,
same with a guardian, same with a trustee?... [D]oes fiduciary imply different
standards, depending on what kind of fiduciary you are? ... Well, would the
test for compensation in this case be the same as any director or any officer of a
corporation? ...Is the fiduciary standard the same, without getting into how its
[sic] applied? Is the fiduciary standard the same for Jones, for a guardian, for a
trustee, for a corporate officer or a corporate director, always the same?... You
said that Congress used "fiduciary" in a special sense. Then . . . I have to
conclude that your earlier answer is confusing for me, because I thought you
were going to tell us that this investment adviser has the same fiduciary
standard that officers and directors of corporations have. Then you say that
Congress used it in this special sense. So that doesn't quite square .... Do you
think Congress used the term "fiduciary" in a very special sense here? I will just
tell you the problem I'm having with the case. If I look at a standard that the
fees must be reasonable and I compare that with what a fiduciary would do, I
thought a fiduciary has the highest possible duty. But apparently the
submission is the fiduciary has a lower duty, a lesser duty than to charge a
reasonable fee. I just find that quite a puzzling use of the word "fiduciary."
Now, if Congress uses it as a term of art or in some special sense, fine.... But it
seems to me an odd use of the term "fiduciary." I don't know why Congress
didn't use some other word.
176. Id. at 27 ("Do you think the fiduciary status of the defendant in this case is different
from the fiduciary status of a president of a corporation?").
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level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not
77
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.'
Unfortunately, it seems like Justice Cardozo's famous fiduciary duty
standard failed to lend support to the Court's discussion of the Gartenberg
standard. As explained below, the Court generally interpreted section
36(b)'s fiduciary duty by adopting the Gartenbergstandard.
Importantly and critically, however, the focus of oral arguments turned
from a discussion of the legal standard itself to a discussion of how to apply
the fiduciary duty standard to actual facts. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
focused her questions on the proper comparison between the fees charged
and the actual services rendered.7 7 The fund shareholders' attorney
responded that a disputed issue of fact was whether the services provided to
institutional clients were greater than those provided to fund clients, even
though fund clients were charged more.' 79
Chief Justice John G. Roberts sought to understand how the fiduciary
duty standard applied to determine a lawful range of fees: "what if the
adviser had given such good advice that the fund beat the industry average
for his category of fund by five percent over the last five years. Does he get
double the normal compensation of the average fees? Does he get triple?
Fifty percent more? How is the court supposed to decide that?"8 0 The
shareholders' attorney answered that when investment advisers buy the
same stocks and achieve the same performance for both institutional and
fund clients, then "there is no reason why the mutual fund should be
charged twice as much."'
Justice Sonia Sotomayor provided analytical precision in focusing the
argument on "what everyone's skirting around, which is what's the proof
that a particular transaction is not arm's-length?"8 2 The fund shareholders'
177. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (emphasis added) (citations

omitted). I think that it is fair to conclude that Justice Cardozo's view of fiduciary duty
differs dramatically from Judge Easterbrook's.
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Jones, 559 U.S. 335 (No. 08-586) ("But there was
in this record, was there not, a submission by the adviser comparing what mutual funds this
fund was charged, what institutional funds were charged, but explaining the differential in
terms of the services provided, that more services were provided to the fund and less services
were provided to the institutional investors.").
179. Id.

180. Id.at9-10.
181. Id. at 10.

182. Id. at 15. It might be prudent, at some level, to recognize that Justice Sotomayor was
born in New York, worked in the New York County District Attorney's Office, litigated
commercial cases in a New York City law firm, served as a federal trial judge in the United
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attorney responded, "Fair against what the adviser actually charged for
83
same or similar services to an outsider who had the right to walk away."
Echoing this argument, the Solicitor General explained that the Court's
duty was not simply "to establish what the single most reasonable fee would
be," but instead "whether the bargain fell within the range of what arm's
length bargaining otherwise would have achieved." 4 Justice Sotomayor
asked the critical questions, "how much deviance, and what is the scope of
the range?"'8 5 The Solicitor General replied:
I think that the term of art of "fiduciary duty" doesn't necessarily
demonstrate how much deviance away from the range there
would be. I think that depending upon the segment of the
market[,] the range might be more or less narrow. In segments of
the market where services are more commodified and
standardized, perhaps with index funds, there might be a much
narrower range of fees that are arrived at through arm's-length
bargaining, and even-and smaller disparities might be
inappropriate there.8 6
Justice Antonin Scalia questioned whether courts always must decide the
reasonableness of an advisory fee, even in cases with full disclosure.' The
Solicitor General answered yes, explaining that courts must "decide whether
the plaintiff has met its burden of proving that [the fee] falls outside the
range of fees that arm's-length bargaining would have arrived at."' The
rationale for this position was Congress's intent to counteract the inherent

States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and served as a federal appellate
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit before she ascended to
her position as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 2009. Biographies of Current
Justices of the Supreme Court, available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). Given
that loads of section 36(b) cases arise in New York and are decided by federal courts within
the Second Circuit, including Gartenberg itself, it is somewhat ironic that a justice with
Justice Sotomayor's background nonetheless could not contemplate a factual scenario in
which an investment adviser could actually breach its fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation.
183. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Jones, 559 U.S. 335 (No. 08-586).
184. Id. at 20.
185. Id. at 26.

186. Id.
187. Id. at 25.
188. Id.
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structural impediments in the mutual fund industry that prohibit arm'slength negotiations between investment advisers and mutual fund boards. 8 9
Justice Sotomayor again pressed for an illustration of how an investment
adviser actually could breach its fiduciary duty:
[L]et's assume that all of the independent board of director
members vote for a particular fee, but the fee is negotiated by an
insider, and the insider is the one who does the evaluation, looks
at them and says: I think this is really a great deal, guys. And they
just fell for it. Is that a process that would guarantee an arm'slength transaction in the sense that Congress intended in [the
ICA] ?190

Undeterred, the investment adviser's attorney countered:
It may not and it may give rise to a cause of action.... It may
give a cause of action under section 36(b) if the circumstances
you described, Justice Sotomayor ...have an impact upon the
fee.... If there is an impact upon fee that is outside of the range
of what could have been bargained. 9 '
Well, that certainly clears it up, doesn't it? That is, the advocate's response
was a ridiculously circular non sequitur. He should have just responded that
yes, indeed, those circumstances would definitely produce a section 36(b)
violation, but only if section 36(b) actually had been violated. And the
circularity could have continued unabated and unabashed!
As oral arguments honed in on how to determine an acceptable, lawful
range, the answers became increasingly vague and unhelpful. Trying to find
evidence of the acceptable range that would satisfy the investment adviser's
fiduciary duty, Chief Justice Roberts asked if "ten percent off," "fifty percent
off," or "[d]ouble, as they say is the case here," is "so far out of bounds."' 92
Evading a precise response, the investment adviser's attorney seemingly
created a safe harbor for all investment advisers: "I suggest there is no
numerical basis, because in fact every kind of mutual fund and [every]
stripe of mutual fund is different."' 93 Chief Justice Roberts pressed, "Well,
then you say: Look to see ifit's outside the bounds, and now you tell me there

189. Id. at 27.
190. Id. at 28.
191. Id. at 28-29.
192. Id. at 31-32.
193. Id. at 32.
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is no way to look to see ifit's outside the bounds."194 Undeterred, the oralist
replied with an illustration:
Well, I think.. . the first comparative would be other funds of a
similar stripe. So, for example, you could imagine that a mutual
fund with the same investment objective and style that is two
times might be inappropriate. You could also imagine a different
circumstance where, passively managed funds for example, a
multiple of fees would be inappropriate.
You could also, though, imagine a case where there is substantial
risk taken, where the types of securities that are invested in are
unusual, where substantial differences could be justified."'
Okay, so now do you understand precisely when an investment adviser
breaches its fiduciary duty? Finally, the fund shareholders' attorney
exasperated, "we had to prove a negative, which is not ordinarily what a
plaintiff has to prove in any law case, by showing [that an advisory fee] ...is
so disproportionate it could not have been achieved at arm's-length."196
b.

Unanimous Supreme Court decision in Jones updates
Gartenberg

In its Jones decision, the Supreme Court began its discussion by
recognizing the unique structure that dominates much of the mutual fund
industry-investment advisers routinely create mutual funds, choose the
funds' board of directors, make the funds' investments, and provide most
services to the funds, all while knowing that most funds do not have the
practical ability to sever their relationships with their advisers.'97
Importantly, the Court appreciated that "the forces of arm's-length
bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as
they do in other sectors of the American economy." 98 To that end, the
Court grasped that section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty was not plucked out of
thin air, but was enacted in response to this reality.
The Court next explored the legislative history and purpose behind
section 36(b). 9 9 The Court also cataloged the tremendous growth enjoyed
194.
195.
196.
Article.
197.
198.
199.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 50. That observation might be worth exploring further, but just not in this
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010).
Id. (quoting S.REp. No. 91-184, at 5 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 339-41.
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by the mutual fund industry in the past half-century, explaining that during
this time "something of a consensus" had formed within the federal
judiciary that the Gartenberg analytical framework-its standard and
factors-was good law.2"' Highlighting Jones's procedural history, the Court
noted that the Seventh Circuit's panel opinion had created a circuit split in
need of resolution. 0
The Court made my day when it declared that the meaning of section
36's fiduciary duty standard "is hardly pellucid" and that the Gartenberg
standard "may lack sharp analytical clarity. 20 2 In general, the unanimous
Court2 3 blessed what the lower federal courts (with the sole exception of the
Seventh Circuit) had been blessing for decades-the Second Circuit's
creation of the proper analytical framework in Gartenberg.2°4 First, the

200. Id. at 343-46.
201. Id. at 342-43 & n.2 (citing Jones, 527 F.3d 627; Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l,
Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140
(3d Cir. 2002); Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009)).
202. Id. at 345, 353. In response, I can only gasp, "You think?" As this Article posits, if a
legal standard cannot be illustrated as to how it applies factually, then it is a monumental
understatement to refer to it as pellucid and lacking in sharp analytical clarity.
203. Writing separately in a concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas quibbled on
whether the Court actually blessed the Gartenbergstandard: "But I would not say that ... we
endorse the 'Gartenberg standard.' Whatever else might be said about today's decision, it
does not countenance the free-ranging judicial 'fairness' review of fees that Gartenbergcould
be read to authorize." Id. at 354-55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 343-46. Not only had the Court recognized that nearly the entire federal
judiciary had been on board with the Gartenbergframework, the Court also recognized that
the SEC had been as well. Id. at 344; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Sched. 14A, Item 22, Para.
(c)(11), which requires the board of directors to adhere to the following Gartenberg-like
regulations in selecting an investment adviser and approving the adviser's fees:
Discuss in reasonable detail the material factors and the conclusions with
respect thereto that form the basis for the recommendation of the board of
directors that the shareholders approve an investment advisory contract.
Include the following in the discussion:
(i) Factors relating to both the board's selection of the investment
adviser and approval of the advisory fee and any other amounts to be
paid by the Fund under the contract. This would include, but not be
limited to, a discussion of the nature, extent, and quality of the
services to be provided by the investment adviser; the investment
performance of the Fund and the investment adviser; the costs of the
services to be provided and profits to be realized by the investment
adviser and its affiliates from the relationship with the Fund; the
extent to which economies of scale would be realized as the Fund
grows; and whether fee levels reflect these economies of scale for the
benefit of Fund investors. Also indicate in the discussion whether the
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Court concluded that the Gartenberg standard "was correct in its basic
formulation":
to face liability under § 36(b), an investment adviser must charge
a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not
have been the product of arm's length bargaining.2 °5
Second, the Court generally welcomed the Gartenbergfactors as having the
analytical ability to properly carry out the Gartenberg standard's
determination of whether section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty has been violated in
6
20
a particular case.

After agreeing with Gartenberg's basic analytical framework, the Court
explained the importance of placing section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty within
the larger context of how the ICA regulates investment advisers.2 7 The
"cornerstone" of the ICA is built on requiring a fully informed board to
scrutinize the adviser and its fee, while also ensuring that disinterested
board members serve as "independent watchdogs" on behalf of fund
shareholders.2 8 To carry out these demands, the ICA then requires that
board relied upon comparisons of the services to be rendered and the
amounts to be paid under the contract with those under other
investment advisory contracts, such as contracts of the same and
other investment advisers with other registered investment
companies or other types of clients (e.g., pension funds and other
institutional investors). If the board relied upon such comparisons,
describe the comparisons that were relied on and how they assisted
the board in determining to recommend that the shareholders
approve the advisory contract; and
(ii) If applicable, any benefits derived or to be derived by the
investment adviser from the relationship with the Fund such as
soft dollar arrangements by which brokers provide research to the
Fund or its investment adviser in return for allocating Fund
brokerage.
205. Jones, 559 U.S. at 346.
206. See id. at 344 & n.5 (quoting Gartenberg,694 F.2d at 929-32) (listing the Gartenberg
factors as follows: "[1] the adviser[]'s cost in providing the service[;] . .. [2] the extent to
which the adviser[] realizes economies of scale as the fund grows larger[;] ... [3] the volume
of orders which must be processed by the [adviser] ....

[4] the nature and quality of the

services provided to the fund and shareholders; [5] the profitability of the fund to the
adviser; [6] any 'fall-out financial benefits,' those collateral benefits that accrue to the adviser
because of its relationship with the mutual fund; [7] comparative fee structure (meaning a
comparison of the fees with those paid by similar funds); and [8] the independence,
expertise, care, and conscientiousness of the board in evaluating adviser compensation.").
207. Id. at 348-49.
208. Id. at 348.
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advisers furnish the board with all information needed to make informed
decisions on fees.20 9 Finally, the ICA authorizes causes of action for the SEC
and fund shareholders to independently reinforce the investment adviser's
fiduciary duty."'0
Focusing on the Gartenbergfactors, the Court explained that the Second
Circuit was a bit too stingy when it rejected evidence that compared the fees
the adviser charged to mutual funds with the fees charged to pension
funds.2" Understanding that the ICA requires that all relevant factors be
considered when analyzing section 36(b) claims, the Court declared that
there can be no "categorical rule regarding the comparisons of the fees
charged different types of clients." l2 Instead, the Court gave the green light
for courts to consider and understand fully the similarities and differences
between what the adviser charges its funds and institutional clients as well
as the services that the adviser provides to those different types of clients.213
Obviously, if the services to both types of clients are comparable, then the
comparison of fees is more probative; if the services are widely disparate,
then fee comparisons become largely irrelevant.214
Again demonstrating its complete understanding of the unique, conflictridden organizational structures found in the mutual fund industry, the
Court stressed that federal "courts should not rely too heavily on
comparisons with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers . . .
because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the product of
negotiations conducted at arm's length."21 5 It seems like common sense to
realize that if the fees that a slew of investment advisers charge their captive
mutual funds do not reflect robust, arm's-length negotiations, then, in the
face of that knowledge, a court's simple comparison of the fees charged to
each captive fund could not logically determine whether any of the advisers
had breached its fiduciary duty. To be sure, the lack of arm's-length
negotiations industry-wide would simply create a floor of fees that would
never be vulnerable to section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty. This point was lost on
the Seventh Circuit, but the Supreme Court fully grasped this reality.
The Court emphasized that the process under which board membersand particularly independent board members-review the investment
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Id. at349-51.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 349-50.
See id. at 350.
Id. at 350-51.
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adviser's fees is relevant.1 6 The more informed and robust the board's
review, the more deference a court should give the board's fee
determination.1 7 When a board's process is deficient or when the board
lacks relevant information, additional scrutiny of the fee is justified.21 s
Notwithstanding the amount of deference, however, a court's responsibility
is to always consider the substance of the fee.21 9
No matter what the evidence shows as to the robustness of the board's
review of the information provided or fee charged, the Court cautioned that
the structure of the federal judiciary also militates against a false conclusion
that judges are somehow magically equipped to determine the appropriate
fee structures for the mutual fund industry. 220 The Court made clear that
section 36(b) "does not call for judicial second-guessing of informed board
decisions. '22 1 Even with the multitude of potential conflicts of interests
within the mutual fund industry, the Court explained that federal judges are
still not given the authority-because they do not have the ability-to
"supplant the judgment of disinterested directors apprised of all relevant
information, without additional evidence that the fee exceeds the arm'slength range." 222 To clarify the federal judiciary's limited role, the Court
explained that an analysis of section 36(b) claims "does not require courts
to engage in a precise calculation of fees representative of arm's-length
bargaining. "223
Because the Supreme Court generally adopted the Gartenberg standard
and factors, the landscape surrounding section 36(b) really did not change
because of the decision in Jones. The same clearly articulated legal standard
and factors still exist. It is equally true, however, that no court has applied
these standards and factors to a set of facts to illustrate a breach of an
investment adviser's fiduciary duty.

216, Id. at 351.
217. Id.

218. Id. at 351-52,
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 352-53 (citing Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2008)

("Judicial price-setting does not accompany fiduciary duties ....
"));
Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997) ("[T]he Court is institutionally unsuited to gather the facts
upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally untrained to make
them.") (alteration in original)).
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C. Lessons Learnedfrom JudicialHistory: Taking Stock of Where We Are
Let's take stock of five things that we know. First, the Seventh Circuit's
conservative, free-market approach with little judicial oversight was
soundly and unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court. It seems that
Judge Easterbrook's overdose on free-market principles clouded his
interpretation of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty. He could not see that
section 36(b)'s purpose was to counter the structural conflicts of interest in
the mutual fund industry that eliminate arm's-length bargaining on fees.
Instead of interpreting actual federal law that regulated the fee relationship
between mutual funds and investment advisers, Judge Easterbrook
interpreted the federal law that he would have voted for had he been a
member of Congress. His approach is not the law.224
Second, a liberal panacea in which federal judges act as hyperactive ratesetters in determining the appropriate and most reasonable fee in every
mutual fund setting was soundly and unanimously rejected by the Supreme
Court. Courts must judicially defer to the fee-bargaining process when it
produces arm's-length results.
Third, the Supreme Court rejected a fully conservative, free-market
approach and a fully liberal, judicial rate-setting approach, 'instead
incorporating a little bit of both approaches. Inherently rejecting an "eitheror" approach for a "both-and" approach, the Court recognized that
Congress's decision to regulate capital markets by enacting section 36(b)'s
fiduciary duty did not entirely leave fee-setting to the free market, but
instead made the investment adviser's fee-setting subject to a judicially
enforceable fiduciary duty. The judicially enforceable fiduciary duty,
however, has built-in deference to mutual fund boards that actually engage
in arm's-length negotiations over fees while armed with all relevant
information.
Fourth, the decades-old Gartenberganalytical framework (including its
standard and factors) that interprets and applies section 36(b)'s fiduciary
duty was generally approved by the Supreme Court. That means everything
that we have not learned in the past four decades is still relevant to what we
do not know today. I am being facetious, but the point is that caselaw
provides a pretty good idea of what type of behavior does not violate section
36(b)'s fiduciary duty. No caselaw illustrates the type of behavior that runs
afoul of section 36(b).
224. Judge Easterbrook's concept of fiduciary duty could not be farther from Justice

Cardozo's. Instead of viewing fiduciary duty as the highest standard known to the law, Judge
Easterbrook took a contrary view by placing an investment adviser's fiduciary duty just
above the obligation to avoid criminal fraud.
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Fifth, it is prudent to realize that a unanimous Supreme Court decided
Jones. Without congressional intervention, section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty
will be subject to the Gartenberg-Jones standard and analytical factors. The
analytical framework and governing legal standard have been set; it is
doubtful that any change will come from Congress or the Supreme Court.
The only remaining question-which has gone unanswered for a long
time-is what facts will meet the standard to discover a violation of section
36(b).22s

As we enter 2015, it certainly seems as if we have not moved much at all
since the Second Circuit issued its Gartenbergdecision in 1982. The federal
judiciary, by and large, has followed the Gartenbergstandard and factors for
the past three decades. There really has never been an urgent need for
clarification of the standard and factors, used to interpret section 36(b)'s
fiduciary duty. The Gartenberg standard and factors have been clearly
articulated all along. What has been missing is an adjudicated illustration of
how the law applies to a real case in which the standard is found to have
been violated.226 We have a precise fiduciary duty with a clear legal standard
as well as easily understood factors without so much as a clue as to how that
law produces a violation of section 36(b). To that extent, we are no closer to
finding an adjudicated illustration of a violation of section 36(b) in 2015

than we were in 1982.227
225. Let me make a common-sense observation. I believe intuitively that not every
investment adviser provides above-average services to warrant above-average fees. By
definition, approximately half of investment advisers will provide above-average services
while the other half will provide below-average services. It is logical to then assume that the
investment advisers who provide above-average services lawfully can charge above-average
fees and, likewise, that investment advisers who provide below-average services lawfully
could not charge anything other than below-average fees. That would seem to be how freemarket, arm's-length bargaining would present itself in the absence of structural
impediments to such bargaining.
226. "Though Congress enacted [section] 36(b) because it recognized the potential for
abuse and wanted to empower shareholders to police excessive fees, section 36(b) is
impotent in practice. Because of the impractical proof standard for succeeding in a [section]
36(b) lawsuit, no plaintiff has ever won a fee case brought under section 36(b)." John P.
Freeman, Stewart L. Brown, & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence
and a FairFiduciaryDuty Test, 61 OKLA. L.REv. 83, 86 (Spring 2008).
227. Let's take a stroll down memory lane to remind ourselves that 1982 was a long time
ago. Here are a few things that happened in 1982: the Color Purple was published; Star Trek
II: The Wrath of Khan was released; Bernie Madoff began implementing a new options
strategy for his investment business; a baby named Kate Middleton was born at Royal
Berkshire Hospital in the United Kingdom; John Belushi died; the North Carolina Tar Heels
defeated the Georgetown Hoyas in the NCAA Men's Division I Basketball Tournament, and
a skinny freshman named Michael Jordan nailed the game-winning shot with only seventeen
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To amplify how strange it is for the law to be in this predicament of
unpredictability, imagine if a traveler wanted to find the way to a
destination, it would be wise to get directions to the exact location. It would
be less than helpful and altogether frustrating for someone to try to lend a
hand by giving the traveler directions to five different locations that are not
to the destination that he is seeking. Similarly, a comedian will face a
difficult task of making people laugh if he only knows what is not funny,
rather than what is funny. These backward scenarios seem to be where we
find ourselves with respect to section 36(b) litigation. We have a pretty good
idea of what does not constitute valid section 36(b) claims, kind of like the
traveler who only gets directions to places he is not going or a comedian
who is given lots of material that is not funny. But we do not have a strong
sense of what constitutes a valid section 36(b) claim.
This Article does not seek to change the federal law of an investment
adviser's fiduciary duty to one side or the other of the debate that has raged
for half a century. This Article does not clamor to loosen the fiduciary duty
standard to allow the free market unfettered and unregulated reign over
advisory fees or the relationship between mutual funds and investment
advisers. Also, this Article does not contend that judicial fee-setting or rateregulation should be the law. Instead, this Article takes the law as it exists in
its current state, as interpreted by the federal judiciary for decades and
recently by a unanimous Supreme Court. The focus of this Article is to
demonstrate that a federally protected fiduciary duty is utterly worthless,
even if recited as a clearly articulable legal standard, until real-world facts
illustrate and compel a legal conclusion that an investment adviser violated
section 36(b) by breaching its fiduciary duty with respect to advisory fees.
Until that moment, section 36(b) will remain an illusory and unjust law.
The next section explores a few cases that, as always, resulted in victories for
investment advisers.
V. JUDICIAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF WHAT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF
SECTION 36(B)'S FIDUCIARY DUTY-THAT IS THE BEST WE HAVE

No matter what the Eighth Circuit concluded in Gallus or what Judge
Posner wrote in his dissent in Jones, no court has entered judgment against
an investment adviser for violating section 36(b). Over three decades ago in
the seminal Gartenbergcase, the Second Circuit uttered a bold statement
seconds left in the game; Steven Spielberg's E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial was released; Michael
Jackson released his mega-hit Thriller; and Bill Clinton was re-elected as Governor of
Arkansas. What Happened in 1982, WORLD HISTORY PROJECT, http://worldhistoryproject.org
/1982/page/I (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
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that Congress intentionally created an unclear legal standard that would
govern the protection afforded to fund shareholders against excessive fees
charged by investment advisers: "[Congress made] no attempt to set forth a
definitive test by which observance or breach of fiduciary duty was to be
determined.

'228

Of course, the Second Circuit's pronouncement was

intended to show that Congress left to the federal judiciary the task of filling
in the blanks in creating a legally enforceable standard to unlock section
36(b)'s protections. I have no doubt that the Second Circuit thought that its
Gartenbergstandard and factors would lay the foundation for establishing
investment adviser liability for breaching section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty.
Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the federal judiciary has "set forth a
definitive test by which observance or breach of fiduciary duty [has been]
determined." Even though section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty and the Gartenberg
standard and factors readily provide the proper analytical framework that
routinely reveals when investment advisers observe their fiduciary duties, we
are left wanting an adjudication of a contested case in which an investment
adviser breaches its fiduciary duty. Over the next few pages, this Article
provides some illustrations of cases in which investment advisers have
prevailed. This exercise will equip you to at least know when courts have
ruled in favor of investment advisers; it will not illustrate when fund
shareholders win.
A. Green v. Fund Asset Management, L.P.
In Green v. Fund Asset Management, L.P.,229 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted the issue of whether "a fee
arrangement in which a fund's investment advisors have an incentive to
maximize leverage in order to increase their advisory fees is not a per se
breach of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties under § 36(b) of the
ICA."23 ° Concluding that it is "clear that potential conflicts of interest in
mutual fund fee arrangements are not per se violations of investment
advisors' fiduciary duties," the court held that "an actual breach must be
alleged and proven. 231
In Green, shareholders in municipal bond funds sued their investment
advisers for violating their section 36(b) fiduciary duties.232 The investment

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).
286 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied,537 U.S. 884 (2002).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 683.
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advisers employed a strategy to increase yield by employing leverage.233 This
strategy allowed the advisers to raise additional capital by selling preferred
stock to then deploy into long-term bonds. 34 For its services, the
investment adviser charged a fee of .5% percent of fund assets. 35 Fund
shareholders alleged "that because the bonds purchased with the proceeds
from the sale of preferred shares are included in the corpus of assets upon
which the advisory fee is based, [the investment advisers] have a strong
financial incentive to keep the Funds fully leveraged," which "creates an
actual conflict of interest between the Funds and their advisors that
amounts to a per se breach of fiduciary duty under § 36(b)."236
Even after recognizing that conflicts of interest inherent in the mutual
fund industry were the impetus for Congress's enacting section 36(b), the
court nonetheless rejected the shareholders' claim by declaring "that § 36(b)
was intended to provide a very specific, narrow federal remedy." 37 Because
fund shareholders failed to identify an instance when the investment
advisers "improperly failed to de-leverage the Funds in order to maximize
their fees and because plaintiffs have not alleged any actual damages they..
suffered as a result of any improper decision by the Funds' investment
advisors, 23 s the court affirmed the district court's granting of summary
judgment to the investment advisers.239
B. In Re Goldman Sachs Mutual Funds Fee Litigation
The case of In re Goldman Sachs Mutual Funds Fee Litigation24
illustrates another way for an investment adviser to prevail. In that case, a
federal trial court showcased an investment adviser to various Goldman
Sachs mutual funds who provided daily advice on portfolio transactions,
was paid fees based on a percentage of the funds' total assets, and selected
brokers for the funds' transactions.24" ' Fund shareholders sued their
investment advisers for violating section 36(b).242 The gravamen of the
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id. at 683-84.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
Id. at 686.
Id. at 683.
No. 04 Civ. 2567(NRB), 2006 WL 126772 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006).

241. Id. at *2.
242. Id. Shareholders also brought a bevy of other claims against various defendants,

alleging violations of other provisions of the ICA and the Investment Advisers Act, breaches
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shareholders' complaints was that the investment adviser charged the funds
excessive fees so that it could fund "kickbacks" or payments to brokerages
that would steer investors into the funds.243 The criticism was that the fees
charged to the funds were not for services that benefitted shareholders, but
rather were simply to increase fund assets that would be subject to the
percentage that the investment adviser charged for its services, i.e., as new
investors flooded the funds with money, advisory fees would explode.2"4 The
investment adviser defended its practice by contending that as assets under
management increased, the adviser could share the benefits of these
economies of scale with the funds.245 Shareholders countered that there was
no evidence that the benefits of such economies of scale were ever shared
with the funds, claiming that fees actually increased as fund assets rose due
to the adviser's "practice
of 'skim[ming]' from the Funds to finance its
246
'marketing campaign.'

These factual allegations were not enough to survive the investment
adviser's motion to dismiss.247 After reciting the Gartenbergstandard and
factors, the court determined that "pleading standards" dictate that the
court need not even analyze the factual allegations under the Gartenberg
factors.2 4'Bypassing any use of the Gartenbergfactors, the court determined
that a sufficiently pled section 36(b) claim required an allegation of facts
that would prove "that the fees are disproportionately large, that they bear
no reasonable relationship to the services rendered or that they could not
have been the product of arm's-length bargaining."2 49 That is, the court
simply restated the Gartenbergstandard as a pleading standard without any
analysis of the underlying factors. The court chastised the shareholders that
their complaint must not simply make conclusory allegations that advisory

of fiduciary duties under state law, and unjust enrichment. Id. at *4.Shareholders lost on all
claims. Id. at *12.
243. Id. at *2.
244. Id. at *2-3.

245. Id. at *3.
246. Id. Fund shareholders alleged that while the funds' net assets increased from $92.2
million to $146.8 million (purportedly driving economies of scale), the net asset value per
share dropped from $12.52 to $7.79 while the "ratio of net expenses to average net assets
[actually] increased from 1.44% to 1.45%." Id.
247. Id. at*7-10.

248. Id. at *8-9 (citing Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928
(2d Cir. 1982)).
249. Id. at *9 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wexler v. Equitable Capital Mgmt. Corp., No.
93 Civ. 3834, 1994 WL 48807 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1994)).
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fees are excessive, but must actually allege facts that would prove that the
50

fees are excessive.1

By simply reading the complaint, the court concluded that the
shareholders' allegations could not prove excessive fees in violation of
section 36(b). The court determined that the fund shareholders' failure to
explain in their complaint "the relationship between the advisory fees and
the services rendered [was] fatal to their claim."25 ' The court cautioned,
"Mere assertions that fees increased with the size of the Funds are not
enough to establish that the benefits from economies of scale were not
passed on to investors."" 2 The essence of the court's holding is that the
allegations never tied the fees charged to the services provided, rendering it
impossible to legally conclude that the fees were excessive.2 3
C. Migdal v. Rowe Price-FlemingInternational,Inc.
This approach sounds a common refrain among federal courts.
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International, Inc.," 4 a generalized,
speculative breach of fiduciary duty claim will not allow a legal conclusion
that section 36(b) has been violated.255 Instead of making general allegations
or conclusory pleadings, the court explained that fund shareholders must
allege facts "that, if true, would support a claim that the fees at issue are
excessive. 25 6 Specifically, "to determine whether a fee is excessive for
purposes of Section 36(b), a court must examine the relationship between
25 7
the fees charged and the services rendered by the investment adviser."
Affirming the summary dismissal, the court concluded that fund
shareholders failed to allege facts that would allow the court to explore the
relationship between fees and services.25 Even though shareholders
challenged the amount of the fees, the shareholders' fatal mistake was

250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *9-10.
254. 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001).
255. Id. at 327-28.
256. Id. at 327.
257. Id.
(emphasis added); see Krantz v. Prudential Inv. Fund Mgmt., LLC, 305 F.3d 140,
143 (3d Cir. 2002).
258. Migdal, 248 F.3d at 327.
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failing to include in the complaint "facts about the services that defendants
offered in return for those fees.

259

What were the facts that led the court in Migdal to affirm summary
dismissal without allowing discovery? Mutual fund shareholders sued their
investment advisers for breach of fiduciary duty in violation of section 36(b)
based on these allegations: (1) "the amount of fees charged by the two
funds"; (2) "two or three similar funds offered lower fee rates than the funds
in this case, while simultaneously outperforming them"; (3) "the two funds
in question did not meet their preselected benchmark performance
standards"; and (4) "despite the funds' underperformance, the . . .
investment advisers' earnings increased by more than 20 percent."2 6 The
failure to allege facts about the services offered that earned those fees was
261

fatal.

The fund shareholders' main contention was that a "funds' performance
is the ultimate proxy for the services offered by the investment advisers[,
because] if a fund underperforms, the services of its investment adviser are
worth less than those offered by the investment adviser of a better
performing fund."2 62 The court rejected this argument: "While performance
may be marginally helpful in evaluating the services which a fund offers,
allegations of underperformance alone are insufficient to prove that an
investment adviser's fees are excessive. .

.

. An under-achieving fund one

year may be an overachieving fund the next."263 In the end, the court made
clear that fund shareholders must allege "more than the mere recitation of
boilerplate statutory language"; without factual allegations of the
relationship between fees charged and services rendered, dismissal is
required.2' 6

259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 326-28.
262. Id. at 327.
263. Id. at 327-28.
264. Id. at 328. In Krantz v. PrudentialInvs. Fund Mgmt., LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir.
2002), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the pleading
standards articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Migdal. The court explained that for fund
shareholders to plead (and prove) a breach of fiduciary duty, they must "examine the
relationship between the fees charged and the services rendered by the investment advisor."
Krantz, 305 F.3d at 143-44 (quoting Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321
(4th Cir. 2001)). Although the court did not recite the facts of the case, it held that the
plaintiff had failed to allege any facts that demonstrated any disproportionality between
services and fees; thus, dismissal was required. Id. at 144. The court noted that "this case is
one of five virtually identical actions filed by Plaintiffs counsel in district courts in four
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D. Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc.
In Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distributors,Inc.,265 the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts asked whether an investment
adviser had violated its fiduciary duty by authorizing and receiving
distribution fees even when the mutual fund was closed to new investors.266
Even though the distribution and service fees were within the limits set by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, fund shareholders contended
that the fees became disproportionate, and thus excessive, when the fund
closed to outside investors.2 6 ' Analyzing the Gartenbergfactors, the court
268
focused only on the independence and conscientiousness of the trustees.
Fund shareholders alleged that the trustees failed to consider as a highly
relevant factor the closing of the fund when they approved the fee plan.269
The court characterized "the crux" of the shareholders' claims as being "that
the fees [were] per se excessive because they exceed the de minimis ongoing
sales expenses of a closed Fund. '270 Unpersuaded, the court explained that
because the SEC had allowed mutual funds to compensate investment
companies for past distribution services, the fees were not per se excessive.27'
Moreover, the trustees had relied on counsel's advice about the fees it
charged.2 2 Aside from that, and probably most importantly, the court
faulted the shareholders for failing "to allege that 'the distribution fees are
disproportionate and unrelated to the sales-related services actually
provided when shares of the funds were marketed and sold to the general
public.' 273 Again, a familiar refrain resounded that a fund shareholder had
failed to provide information for the court to examine the relationship
between the fees charged and services provided.

separate circuits" and "[a]ll of the other courts, including the courts of appeals for the Fourth
Circuit and Second Circuit, have rejected Plaintiffs arguments." Id. at 143.
265. 394 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D. Mass. 2005).
266. Id. at 351.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 355.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 357.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 356-57.
273. Id. at 358 (quoting ING Principal Prot. Funds Derivative Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 163,
169 (D. Mass. 2005)).
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E. In re Dreyfus Mutual Funds Fee Litigation
In a rare departure from the norm of summary dismissal of fund
shareholders' claims, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately pled a
breach of fiduciary duty claim under section 36(b). In the case of In re
Dreyfus Mutual Funds Fee Litigation, the plaintiffs had claimed that their
investment advisers had "breached their fiduciary duties by collecting fees
in excess of standard charges, and in violation of SEC rules, and by failing to
pass savings realized by economies of scale on to the investors."274 Fund
shareholders claimed that their investment advisers had participated in a
form of "an undisclosed mutual fund kick-back scheme."275 Specifically,
fund shareholders alleged that their funds' distributors and advisers used
fund assets to encourage investors to buy shares of their mutual fund, which
would concomitantly increase the fee calculated on the aggregate amount of
money invested.276 In return, the advisers would pay large fees to the board
of directors to gain approval of the kick-back schemes.277 The investment
advisers defended with a common defense, i.e., fund shareholders had failed
to demonstrate that the fees were "so disproportionately large that [they
278
bore] no reasonable relationship to the services rendered."
Following the lead of many courts, this court cautioned that "[m]erely
alleging that fees or costs were high or wrongful is not enough to satisfy the
pleading requirements," but rather the "definitive question is whether the
investors got their money's worth out of their investment managers, not
whether the fee structures were right or wrong, fair or unfair, or high or
low." 279 In other words, the district court focused on the "relationship between

20
the fees charged and the services rendered by the investment advisor."
Even though it concluded that fund shareholders had failed to adequately
address the connection of the fees to the services rendered, the court
nonetheless denied the advisers' motion to dismiss. 28 ' Addressing the
contention that the investment advisers had failed to pass on economies of
scale to the funds, the complaint was spared dismissal.2 2 The court pointed

274. In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342, 344, 349 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
275. Id. at 345.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 349.
279.

Id. at 349-50.

280. Id. at 349.
281. Id. at 350.
282. Id.
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out that Congress had contemplated an economies-of-scale claim when it
recognized that the larger a mutual fund grew, the less expensive it was for
advisers to provide additional services; Congress intended those savings to be
passed to investors. 83 Ultimately, however, the court entered judgment on the
pleadings for the defendants because the plaintiffs had filed the suit as a class
284
action rather than as a derivative suit.

F. Amron v. Morgan Stanley Investment Advisors, Inc.
Nearly a quarter century after Gartenberg,the Second Circuit addressed the
Gartenberg standard and factors in Amron v. Morgan Stanley Investment
Advisors, Inc.285 Attempting to track the Gartenberg factors in their
complaints, fund shareholders sued their investment advisers.286 Even though
the complaints tracked the factors, the court held that the complaints had
failed to meet the Gartenberg standard: "nowhere does either complaint, in
sum or substance, indicate how or why the fees are 'so disproportionately large
that they bear no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could
not have been the product of arm's-length bargaining."' 28 7 The court analyzed
the plaintiffs' allegations under the Gartenbergfactors. Regarding the nature
and quality of the services provided, the plaintiffs merely alleged that their
fund underperformed an index.28 8 As to the second and third Gartenberg
factors, the plaintiffs complained that they could not obtain this evidence
without discovery, but they proceeded to speculate about what evidence they
might uncover.28 9 Although the plaintiffs provided some alleged evidence as to
the fifth factor, the court noted that it was largely just "speculation, inference
about the securities industry from public figures
and generalized observations
290
Buffett."
such as Warren
The court did not bless such speculation and generalized information. The
court deemed it fatal that fund shareholders had failed to allege the total
amount of fees charged.291 Moreover, the court recognized that fund
shareholders had utterly failed to allege the amount of operating costs or the

283. Id.
284. In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
285. 464 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2006).
286. Id. at 341.
287. Id. at 342.
288. Id. at 341.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 343.
291. Id. at 344.
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economies of scale.292 Because fund shareholders had failed to allege facts
necessary to demonstrate the relationship between fees and the2 93services, the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the shareholders' claims.
Ponder whether there are other areas of the law with a similar history to
section 36(b) litigation. Can you name a legal standard that has endured for
decades without being subject to an adjudicated illustration of how it
actually-and not theoretically in a legalistic, unrealistic world-applies to
actual cases with real people and real facts? The failure of any court to find in
any case at any time that an investment adviser has breached its fiduciary duty
with respect to the fees that it charged mutual fund shareholders has gone on
for decades. It seems like the clear legal standard of Gartenberg,and now Jones,
may never apply to an actual case. Could this streak last in perpetuity? So far,
the streak of no adjudicated victories in section 36(b) cases goes on, day after
day, month after month, year after year, decade after decade. Whether section
36(b) cases get dismissed at the pleadings294 or summary judgment stages,29 s
292.

Id. at 345.

293.

Id. at 344.

294. See, e.g., Laborers' Local 265 Pension Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d 399 (6th Cir.
2014); Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2012); Operating Local
649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC, 595 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2010); Bellikoff
v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007); Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv.Advisors Inc.,
464 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2006); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140 (3d Cir.
2002); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001); Verkouteren v.
Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 208 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2000); Levy v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 189
F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1990);
Gartenberg v. Merill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982); Turner vs. Davis
Select Advisers LP & Davis Distribs. LLC, No. 08-CV-421-TUC-AWT (Ariz. May 31, 2011); In
re Am. Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No, CV 04-5593 GAF (RNBx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120597,2009
WL 5215755 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2009); Mintz v. Baron, No. 05 Civ. 4904(LTS)(HBP), 2009 WL
735140 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2009); Hoffman v. UBS-AG, 591 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Alexander v. Allianz Dresdner Asset Mgmt. of Am. Holding, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn.
2007); In re Scudder Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 1921(DAB), 2007 WL 2325862 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 14, 2007); In re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 677 (D.N.J. 2007); Zucker v.
Federated S'holder Svcs. Co., No. 2:06cv241, 2007 WL 709305 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2007); In re
Evergreen Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 240 F.RD. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 WL 2355411 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14,2006); Everett v. Bozic, No. 05 Civ.
00296(DAB), 2006 WL 2291083 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2006); In re Merrill Lynch Inv. Mgmt. Funds
Sec. Litig., 434 F. Supp. 2d 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Morgan Stanley & Van Kampen Mat. Fund
Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 8208(RO), 2006 WL 1008138 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2006); In re Dreyfus Mut.
Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Oppenheimer Funds Fees Litig., 426
F. Supp. 2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Goldman Sachs Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ.
2567(NRB), 2006 WL 126772 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006); In re AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund
Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4885(SWK), 2006 WL 74439 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006); In re
Columbia Entities Litig., No. 04-11704-REK, 2005 WL 6776751 (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2005); Stegall
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after voluntary settlement, 96 or even after a bench trial,297 one outcome is
consistent-there is no reported case that illustrates when an investment

v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358 (D. Mass. 2005); Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc., 394 F.
Supp. 2d 350 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Davis Selected Mut. Funds Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4186(MGC),
2005 WL 2509732 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 11, 2005); In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d
342 (W.D. Pa. 2005); ING Principal Prot Funds Derivative Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass.
2005); Wicks v. Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, No. Civ.A.04-10988-GAO, 2005 WL 705360 (D.
Mass. Mar. 28, 2005); King v. Douglass, 973 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Some recent section
36(b) cases have survived a motion to dismiss, but their fates are not yet determined. See, e.g.,
Zehrer v. Harbor Capital Advisors, Inc., No. 14 C 789 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 2014); Am. Chems. &
Equip., Inc. 401(K) Ret Plan v. Principal Mgmt. Corp., No. 4:14-cv-00044-JAJ, 2014 WL
5426908 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2014); Kasilag v. Hartford Inv. Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 11-1083
(RMB/KMW), 2012 WL 6568409 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2012). Additionally, there have been section
36(b) cases that have successfully stated claims that survived various motions to dismiss, but
these cases did not proceed to trial. See, e.g., R.W. Grand Lodge of F. & A.M. of Pa. v. Salomon
Bros. All Cap Value Fund, 425 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Federated Mut. Funds Excessive
Fee Litig., No. 04cv352, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28132 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 8, 2011); Sins v. Janus
Capital Mgmt., LLC, Nos. 04-cv-01647-WDM-MEH, 04-cv-02395-MSK-CBS, 2006 WL 3746130
(D. Colo. Dec. 15, 2006); Dumond v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., No. Civ. A. 04-11458-GAO, 2006 WL
149038 (D. Mass. Jan.19, 2006); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., Inc., No. C 04-00883 SI, 2005 WL
645529 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2005); Miller v. Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., No. 01-CV00192DRH, 2003 WL 24260305 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2003); Millenco L.P. v. MEVC Advisors, Inc.,
No. CIV. 02-142-JJF, 2002 WL 31051604 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2002); Krantz v. Fid. Mgmt. &
Research Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2000); In re TCW/DW N. Am. Gov't Income Trust
Sec. Litig., 941 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfand, Inc., 559 F.
Supp. 429 (D. Conn. 1983).
295. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010); Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin.,
Inc., 675 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 2012); Steinberg v. Janus Capital Mgmt., LLC, 457 F. App'x 261
(4th Cir. 2011); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt. L.P., 286 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 2002); Pfeiffer v.
Bjurman, Barry & Assocs., 215 F. App'x 30 (2d Cir. 2007).
296. See, e.g., Bennett v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., Nos. 04-11651-MLW, 04-11756MLW, 2011 WL 98837 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2011) (Plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal on January
27, 2012. See Bennett v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., No. 1:04-cv-11651-MLW, 1:04-cv11756-MLW, Stipulation of Dismissal (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2012)); Reso ex rel. Artisan Int'l
Fundv. Artisan Partners Ltd. P'ship, No. 11-CV-873-JPS, 2011 WL 5826034 (E.D. Wis. Nov.
18, 2011) (see Sean M. Murphy, James N. Benedict, Robert C. Hora, & Michael B. Weiner,
Developments in Litigation Under Section 36(b) of the 1940 Act 22 (Nov. 2013), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/13 seclaw_05a.pdf); Curran ex rel. Principal Funds, Inc. v. Principal
Mgmt. Corp., LLC, No. 4:09-cv-00433 RP-CFB, 2011 WL 223872 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 24, 2011)
(shortly after a motion to dismiss was granted on reconsideration, a new complaint was filed.
The parties settled shortly thereafter.) (dismissal order after settlement can be found online
at

http://investorscoalition.com/sites/default/files/Curran%20v%2OPrincipal%2Mgmt%2OCor
p%20-%200rder%20of%20Dismissal%206-12-2013.pdf); Korland v. Capital Research &
Mgmt. Co., No. CV-08-4020 GAF, 2009 WL 936612 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2009); Boyce v. AIM
Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. H-04-2587, 2007 WL 7117575 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2007); Hunt v.
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adviser has breached its fiduciary duty under section 36(b). Justice has not
been-and cannot be-achieved under this phenomenon.
VI. So WHAT IS A BREACH OF SECTION 36(B)'s FIDUCIARY DUTY?
I KNOW IT WHEN I SEE IT?
I have had the privilege to teach law students at Creighton University
School of Law, Stetson University College of Law, the University of
Nebraska College of Law, and Liberty University School of Law. As
mentioned iri the Introduction, I teach students that law is worthless
without facts and that facts are worthless without law. Neither law nor facts
exists in a vacuum; instead, each is wholly dependent upon the other. My
students must not only state precise governing legal standards, they must
also illustrate how those standards apply to real-world facts. Law is simply
not meant to be studied in books and occupy one's mind. Law is the
application of collective values to real cases involving real people in real life.
Why did I open this section with that pedagogical discussion? Because what
is true for law students assuredly is true for attorneys and courts. Can you
precisely state the legal standard that governs liability under section 36(b)?
Of course you can quote section 36(b) and the Gartenberg-Jones standard.
Can you precisely state the factors that analytically unlock the underlying
legal standard? I know that you can list the Gartenberg-Jones factors
precisely without difficulty. But now to prove whether your knowledge of
the law exists in a vacuum void of facts, can you likewise describe
adjudicated scenarios in which an investment adviser has violated its
section 36(b) fiduciary duty? If not, then the legal standard is illusory at
worst or theoretical at best. Without a collective understanding of the law's
application to actual cases, each person is left to a foggy understanding of
what is just without the ability to predict what conduct is unlawful. Justice
cannot be achieved under these conditions.
Is there no way to confidently conduct legal analysis to forecast a
violation of section 36(b)? In Jacobellis v. State of Ohio,29s Justice Potter
Stewart penned what might be the most famous line ever delivered from the
Supreme Court. Without my giving it away, I suspect that many readers
already have quoted Justice Stewart's famous line. In Jacobellis,the Supreme
Invesco Funds Grp., Inc., No. H-04-02555, 2006 WL 1581846 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006) (see
Murphy, supra,at 18-19); Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 188 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
297. See, e.g., Jelinek v. Capital Research & Mgmt. Co., 448 F. App'x 716 (9th Cir. 2011);
Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989); Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime
Reserve Fund, Inc., 835 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987).
298. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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Court reversed the conviction of a defendant for possessing and exhibiting
an obscene film in violation of state law.299 In essence, the Court concluded
that because the film (and one scene, in particular) was not obscene, the
First Amendment protected the defendant from prosecution."' Admitting
that obscenity cases might just involve "the task of trying to define what
may be indefinable," Justice Stewart would have limited obscenity
prosecutions to hard-core pornography." 1 That was as far as Justice Stewart
was willing to go, admitting that he did not attempt a further definition
because "perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so."30 2 Justice
Stewart then wrote the words that have followed his name for fifty years:
"But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is
not that."03
When reading section 36(b) fee-litigation cases that interpret and apply
the Gartenbergstandard and factors, my mind quizzically asked if I know it
when I see it. Indeed, this Article asks whether the law is capable of
knowing a section 36(b) violation when it sees it. If not, then we each must
individually apply our own I-know-it-when-I-see-it standard to illustrate
when an investment adviser breaches its fiduciary duty under section 36(b).
No person would ever wish to be judged under such an ill-defined, wholly
subjective standard of liability. If there is no collective sense as to when a
judicial standard applies to real people's conduct, then the judicial standard
is unjust.
Perhaps the closest factual illustration of when an investment adviser
breaches its fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation
might be when the adviser extracts much greater fees from its captive retail
funds than it can from its non-captive institutional clients. This evidence
has been recognized as highly probative by the Eighth Circuit in Gallus...
and Judge Posner's dissent in Jones."5 The stark contrast in these situations
reveals precisely what arm's-length bargaining can accomplish in terms of
the fees that an investment adviser can charge. At oral argument before the
Supreme Court in Jones, the fund shareholders' attorney argued that "the
best gauge of a fair fee is what the investment adviser charges at arm's-

299. Id. at 185-87.
300. Id. at 187, 190, 196.
301. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
302. Id.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 675 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 2012).
305. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
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length in other transactions for similar services" and, "applying that
standard here, [the investment adviser] charged twice as much in
percentage terms for providing virtually identical advisory services in
30 6
arm's-length transactions with institutional investors.
Please allow me to provide an analogy that might best illustrate how
probative this evidence can be. Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, the
lead plaintiff in the Jones case is named Jerry Jones. °7 Let's call this Jerry
Jones Middle Class Jones. To recap, Middle Class Jones's main contention is
that his fund's investment adviser breached its fiduciary duty by charging
captive retail investors twice as much as it charged institutional investors
for similar advisory services. Middle Class Jones does not personally
negotiate the fee that he will pay for the services provided to him; instead,
his fund's board of directors negotiated the fee. And the investment adviser
created the fund, selected the board members, and provided the board with
the information that the board used to retain the investment adviser and its
fees. Being captive, the fund did not have the luxury to seek the services of
another investment adviser. At the end of the "fee negotiations," assume
that the captive retail fund of which Middle Class Jones is a shareholder
entrusted $2 billion to the investment adviser and paid a 1% fee.
Now assume that there is another Jerry Jones. Let's call him Moneybags
Jones and further assume that he happens to be the Jerry Jones who owns
the Dallas Cowboys and stands as the 166th richest American with a net
worth of $3 billion.30 ' Assume that Moneybags Jones also entrusted his
money with the same investment adviser as Middle Class Jones. Instead of
investing alongside Middle Class Jones in a captive retail mutual fund,
however, Moneybags Jones approached multiple investment advisers to
negotiate fees and services. Moneybags Jones engaged in tough, adversarial
negotiations with investment advisers, who knew that he had every
opportunity to walk away from the negotiations to entrust his funds to
another adviser if Moneybags Jones did not like the fees-for-services offer.
After hard-fought negotiations, Moneybags Jones agreed to entrust $2
billion to the investment adviser and paid a .5% fee.30 9
306. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, Jones v. Harris Assocs, L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010)
(No. 08-586).
307. Jones, 559 U.S. at 335.
308. FORBES, The Forbes 400: The Richest People in America, http://www.forbes.com
/profile/jerry-jones/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
309. To make the point starker and more bitter, Moneybags Jones might even have the
ability to only entrust $100 million to the investment adviser for the same .5% fee, and then
get discounted fees as amounts under management exceed $100 million. This could only
seem too-good-to-be-true to Middle Class Jones.
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The question that screams out is what made Middle Class Jones pay
twice the advisory fee than what Moneybags Jones paid for similar services.
The answer that echoes in response is that Moneybags Jones had the
protection of using the competitive free marketplace to its fullest advantage
to engage in arm's-length bargaining over fees and services. Middle Class
Jones and his captive mutual fund, on the other hand, did not enjoy arm'slength bargaining over fees, nor did they reap the rewards that come from
free-market competition.1
The disparate fees charged to Middle Class Jones's mutual fund versus
those charged to Moneybags Jones's institutional account dramatically
impacts performance. Assume that the investment adviser averages an 8%
annual return for forty years for both Middle Class Jones and Moneybags
Jones. Absorbing a 1% advisory fee, Middle Class Jones's mutual fund will
be worth $29.1 billion, while Moneybags Jones will be worth $35.6 billion
after paying half the advisory fee. Even though both accounts entrusted the
same $2 billion with the same investment adviser, enjoyed the same returns,
and received generally the same advisory services, the client with bargaining

310. I hold shares in two Dodge and Cox mutual funds, which treat me as a middle-class
investor the same as they treat their moneybags investors. According to a recent article in
Barron's, "Dodge & Cox funds are sold in the equivalent of frustration-free packaging. The
funds have just one share class, and all investors, whether institutions or individuals with the
$2,500 minimum, pay the same expense ratio, which ranges from 0.45% to 0.66% depending
on the fund." Sarah Max, The Minimalists Next Door, BARRON'S (Jan. 12, 2015). I also have
long-held shares in the Sequoia Fund, which also charges retail and institutional investors
the same advisory fee. When asked if the investment adviser was "ever going to lower the 1%
fee," the investment adviser's president responded, "Our asset base is about $8 billion and
our cash is about $1.6 billion. We charge a flat 1%on both the separately managed portfolios
and on Sequoia because they are treated the same. They get the same allocations; they buy
the same stocks, et cetera. We have had that fee structure for decades and we hope to be able
to continue to earn it." Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb Investor Day at 9, St. Regis Hotel, New
York City (May 16, 2014), availableat
http://www.sequoiafund.com/Reports/Transcriptl4.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). On a
brief side note, when Warren Buffett liquidated his investment partnerships, he offered his
partners three options: (1) leave the partnerships with cash; (2) accept Berkshire Hathaway
stock; or (3) take shares in the Sequoia Fund, which was run by a legendary investor and
contemporary of Buffett, Bill Ruane. Warren Buffett, Letter to the Partners, May 29, 1969,
available at http://www.bengrahaminvesting.ca/Resources/links.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2015); see ANDREW KILPATRICK, OF PERMANENT VALUE: THE STORY OF WARREN BUFFETT 57
(1994); Graham Summers, The Sequoia Fund, iSTOCK ANALYST (Aug. 14, 2008, 2:23 PM),
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle/articleid/2513932.
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power outpaced the client without bargaining power by $6.5 billion. Fees
matter!pl
While I grew up, I often heard my factory-worker, union-dues-paying
father say, "The rich get richer and the poor get poorer." I have never been
fully persuaded by the accuracy of this oft-cited blue-collar perspective, but
as the saying relates to fees for advisory services, it seems evident that the
poor certainly do not enjoy the same benefits that the free market offers to
the rich. In terms of the impact that fees have on wealth creation, there is no
doubt that if the rich enjoy the free market's offer of unlimited and
unrestrained bargaining power to negotiate lower fees while the poor or less
wealthy, by contrast, have a limited and restrained opportunity to negotiate
lower fees, the rich undoubtedly will pull away in growing their wealth over
time for no other reason than the drag on performance that comes from
higher fees.312
311. I doubt that the impact that fees have on investment performance can be overillustrated. To that end, here is a further demonstration of how fees impact the net returns of
investors. This illustration, while similar to the Jones illustration, emphasizes the differences
in wealth creation caused by disparate fees when funds are collectivized, i.e., a lot of
Moneybags Jones are aggregated to compare them to a lot of Middle Class Jones who are
aggregated. Because it has been approximately forty years since section 36(b)'s federally
protected fiduciary duty was enacted, let's use that time period to illustrate anew the impact
that fees have on investment returns. Assume that an investment adviser manages two $20
billion accounts, both accounts compound at 8% per year for forty years, and the adviser
charges fees of .3% of Fund l's assets and 1% of Fund 2's assets. At the end of forty years,
Fund 1 will have paid fees totaling $15,418,657,900.22, and its net assets would be
$385,288,944,574.28. Tragically, Fund 2 will have paid fees totaling a staggering
$42,242,019,242.15, and its net assets would be $290,661,826,995.98, nearly $100 billion less
than similarly situated Fund 1. Fees matter! To further highlight what is at stake, let's finally
assume that the adviser manages two $100 billion accounts, each account compounds at 8%
per year for forty years, and the adviser charges fees of.3% of Fund l's assets and 1%of Fund
2's assets. At the end of forty years, Fund 1 will have paid fees totaling $77,093,289,501.08,
and its net assets would be $1,926,444,722,871.38; Fund 2 will have paid fees totaling a
breath-taking $211,210,096,210.74, and its net assets would be $1,453,309,134,979.91. The
difference in net assets caused only by fees equals $473,135,587,891.47. That is nearly onehalf trillion dollars. Only twenty-six nations enjoy gross domestic products that are larger.
2013 List of Gross Domestic Product by Nation, WORLD BANK (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://databank.worldbank.orgldata/download/GDP.pdf. Indeed, the excess fees collected in
the last scenario are greater than the gross domestic product of well-established nations such
as Austria, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Denmark, and Israel. Fees matter!
312. A recent article on YAHOO FINANCE further illustrates this point. See Ronald
Delegge, Portfolio Report Card: A $171,000 Retirement Portfolio Weighed Down by Cost,
YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/portfolio-report-card-171-000225223998.html. In this article, the author conducted a "Portfolio Report Card" for a 49
year-old U.S. Marine Corps Officer referred to as K.B. K.B.'s retirement plan consists of
$171,946 invested in twelve mutual funds and two stocks. Id. K.B.'s largest holding is a
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One of America's wealthiest individuals, Warren Buffett, serves as the
long-standing Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, and Chief
Executive Officer of the highly successful Berkshire Hathaway.313 He often
criticizes public policy (focusing mostly on taxation) that results in favoring
the wealthy over less fortunate members of society; his criticism is often
countered with criticism that he is playing class warfare with issues.314
Addressing such criticism head-on, Buffett exclaims, "There's class warfare,
all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're
winning."3" 5 If such a class-warfare debate focused on investment advisory
fees, then I would tend to agree with Buffett on who is winning.
To counter the unnecessary result of the wealthy getting preferred
treatment on fees, or at least the less wealthy getting taken to the cleaners by
high fees, Buffett implores average retail investors to keep their investing
costs low to maximize returns. Buffett has given crystal-clear investment
instructions to the trustee who will control significant assets held in trust
for the benefit of Buffett's wife: "Put 10% of the cash in short-term
government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I
suggest Vanguard's.3 16 ) I believe the trust's long-term results from this
mutual fund with a .66% fee, while five of his mutual funds charge sales loads greater than
4% and annual fees greater than 1%. Id. The author gives his strong opinion that "[K.B.]'s
getting taken to the cleaners on cost." Id. The author estimates that K.B. will forfeit $17,000,
or 10% of his current portfolio, if he keeps his money in the high-fee mutual funds. Id. In a
huge understatement, the author concluded, "That's a lot of money to be leaving on the

table!" Id. I doubt that K.B.'s investment performance would be weighed down by fees as
much if he were a billionaire with bargaining power on fees rather than a middle-class
Marine.

313. Warren Buffett, Letter to the Shareholders, February 28, 2014, available at

http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20131tr.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
314. Ben Stein, Everybody's Business, In Class Warfare, Guess Which Class is Winning,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/business/yourmoney
/26every.html? r=0.
315. Id.
316. Under the decades-long leadership of low-fee evangelist Jack Bogle, Vanguard
Funds are doing extremely well these days as Americans pull their money from actively
managed, high-fee funds to entrust with passively managed, low-fee funds. See Kirsten
Grind, Investors Shun Stock Pickers: Index Funds Run by Vanguard See Record Inflows as
Savers Turn to Autopilot, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2015, at Al; Pauline Skypala, Vanguard Funds
Prosper by
Low
Cost
Evangelism,
FIN.
TIMES
(July
14,
2014),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/c54941ce-0b22-1 le4-ae6b-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3jiYbKwqc.
Vanguard's mutual funds have been described as unique in the mutual fund industry for

being a mutually run group of funds owned by its funds' investors. Id. One reporter

characterized Vanguard as "a lone voice for many years evangelising the importance of low

costs; and it makes good on that by offering some of the lowest cost index trackers and
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policy will be superior to those attained by most investors-whether
pension funds, institutions or individuals-who employ, high-fee
managers."317 If this low-fee strategy is good enough for the estate of the
greatest investor of all time, then it might be prudent for retail investors to
consider it as well.318 If retail investors were to avoid high advisory fees, then
section 36(b) would become mostly irrelevant.
Recent studies reveal that the wealthy are doing well relative to their
fellow citizens and to historical norms. For example, the time period leading
up to the stock market crash of 1929 exhibited massive differences in wealth
among classes in America. At that time, the top .1% of Americans
controlled 25% of the wealth, and the bottom 90% held just 16% of
America's wealth. 19 By the time that Gartenbergrolled around in the early
1980s, on the other hand, the American middle class controlled 36% of
household wealth versus 9% being controlled by the top .1%.320 Over the
past three decades, the roles have once again reversed in a big way:
The 16,000 families making up the richest 0.01%, with an average
net worth of $371 [million], now control 11.2% of total wealthback to the 1916 share, which is the highest on record. Those
actively managed funds on the market." Id. Similar to Buffett's advice, Vanguard preaches
low-cost, buy-and-hold investing focused on the long term. Id. As a mutually run group of
funds, Vanguard's average expense ratio of 0.19% strangles the industry average of 1.08%. Id.
317. Warren Buffett, Letter to the Shareholders, February 28, 2014, available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20131tr.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
318. The drumbeat to avoid actively managed, high-fee funds is growing strong. See Ken
Thume, Why Index Funds Beat Actively-Managed Funds: Top Reasons to Choose Index Funds
for Investing, ABOUT MONEY, http://mutualfunds.about.com/od/Index-Investing/a/WhyIndex-Funds-Beat-Actively-Managed-Funds.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); Kirsten Grind,
Vanguard Sets Record Funds Inflow: Investors Gave Stock Pickers a Vote of No Confidence in
2014, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-sets-record-fundsinflow-1420430643. In an ominous-sounding WALL STREET JOURNAL blog that declares The
Decline and Fall of Fund Managers, Jason Zweig profiles Charles Ellis as "widely regarded as
the dean of the investment-management industry" and "revered among money managers."
Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor, The Decline and Fall of Fund Managers, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/08/22/the-decline-and-fall-of-fundmanagers/. In Ellis's career, he founded a financial consulting firm, advised Singapore's
sovereign-wealth fund, authored sixteen books, and chaired Yale University's investment
committee. Id. Recently, Ellis declared, "With rare exceptions, active management is no
longer able to earn its keep," and that because it is so difficult for money managers to beat
the market, "the money game of outperformance after fees is, for clients, no longer a game
worth playing." Id.
319. Free Exchange, Forget the 1%, It is the 0.01% Who are Really Getting Ahead in
America, EcONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/node/21631129/print.
320. Id.
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down the distribution have not done quite so well: the top 0.1%
(consisting of 160,000 families worth $73 [million] on average)
hold 22% of America's wealth, just shy of the 1929 peak-and
exactly the same share as the bottom 90% of the population.321
Additionally, try to wrap your head around these statistics: the top .004% of
the world's adult population controls approximately 13% of the total global
wealth; and at some point this year, the wealthiest 1% will hold 50% of the
world's wealth with the remaining 50% held by the remaining 99% of the
world's population, i.e., 1% will equal 99%!322
Although it may seem like I am on a tired socialist diatribe against
American inequality (which inappropriately equates wealth and income, by
the way), that is not my intent. Instead, I use these statistics only to illustrate
how free-market, arm's-length bargaining lowers investment advisory fees
for the wealthy and how lower fees improve investment results in a big way
over time. On the other hand, unfortunately, millions of less wealthy
Americans do not enjoy the fee-lowering power of arm's-length
negotiations and competition. Over time, I contend, the fee disparity alone
contributes massively to the amount of wealth enjoyed by the wealthy as
opposed to the less wealthy. Ironically, perhaps, investment advisers are
part of the wealthy class; they extract higher fees from the less wealthy class;
the cycle continues! Section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty attempted to even the
playing field somewhat by ensuring that captive retail investors had the
same bargaining power on fees as to their collective trillions of dollars as
enjoyed by non-captive investors with their trillions of dollars.
Even though fund shareholders do not prevail in court cases with
adjudicated outcomes, some fund shareholders have garnered'

321. Id.
322. Emily Jane Fox, The Ultra-Wealthy Get $2 Trillion Wealthier, CNN (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/19/luxury/ultra-wealthy-got-wealthier/index.html?sr=fbmoney
11 1914wealthO345story; Faith Karimi, Wealthiest 1% Will Soon Own More Than the Rest of Us
Combined, Oxfam Says, CNN (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/19/world/wealthinequality/index.html. Robert Frank, a CNBC author, recently cited two academic papers to
explain that wealth inequality can be attributed, in part, to "higher investment returns of the
wealthy." Robert Frank, It's True, the Rich Do Get Richer-Here's Why (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102196033. Frank explained that the wealthiest 1% of Americans invest
75% of their savings, while middle-class Americans lock up 63% of their assets in their homes. Id.
Additionally, the top 1% outpaced middle-class Americans by nearly 3% in investment returns
over a four-year time period. Id.
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Although settlements are fine for the parties involved, they
cannot inform the boundaries of the law. Settled cases are not precedential;
they have little predictive value on whether the law had been violated in a
given case. But some settled cases leave little doubt that the law was
violated.
Perhaps the most egregious illustration of a section 36(b) violation, albeit
not an adjudicated one, can be found in the SEC's 2012 lawsuit against an
investment adviser. 324 The SEC alleged that the investment adviser, for more
than a decade, charged a mutual fund for services that it did not provide.325
Let me just repeat that fact for effect-an investment adviser charged
advisory fees without providing a service! To settle the suit without
admitting liability, the investment adviser agreed to not violate securities
laws in the future, disgorge $1.3 million of its advisory fees, and pay a
$250,000 penalty. 326 To showcase its tough stance on excessive fees, the SEC
also sued Morgan Stanley for its "shoddy oversight" of the outside
Malaysian investment adviser. 327 Morgan Stanley served as a sub-adviser to
the mutual fund, and even though it provided no services, charged the
fund's shareholders $1.8 million.3 28 To settle the claims against it, Morgan
Stanley agreed to repay the entire $1.8 million to the fund plus a $1.5
million penalty to the SEC for a total settlement of $3.3 million.329 A partner
at Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy stated that this settlement is the first
SEC enforcement action on mutual-fund fees in over three decades.330
This settlement, with all of its fanfare, however, does not aid the
interpretation and application of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty or the
Gartenberg-Jones standard. The reason is simple-it is elemental that the
failure to provide any services in exchange for advisory fees per se results in
fees that are so disproportionately large that they bear no reasonable
relationship to the services rendered. What kind of rational investor would
enter into arm's-length bargaining with an investment adviser in which the
323. See Reso ex rel. Artisan Int'l Fund v. Artisan Partners L.P., No. 11-CV-873 (E.D.
Wis. Aug. 23, 2012); Curran v. Principal Mgmt. Corp., LLC, No. 4:09-cv-433, 2011 WL
223872 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 24, 2011).

324. SEC v. Ammb Consultant Sendirian Berhad, No. 1:12-Cv-01052 (D.D.C. June 26,
2012), Litig. Release No. 22402, 103 S.E.C. Docket 3669, 2012 WL 2411466 (June 27, 2012).
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Jean Eaglesham & Brett Philbin, First Shot Firedin Fee Fight-MorganStanley to Pay
$3.3 Million to End SEC's Mutual-Fund Oversight Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2011, at C1.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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investor pays for non-existent advisory services? This ground-breaking case
is nothing more than a fraud action. It does not aid a serious search for a
disputed case in which section 36(b) has been violated or for an
examination of the precise boundaries of the law in close, contested cases. I
suspect that this egregious example of what took place in the multi-trillion
dollar mutual fund industry is not an isolated case.
For over two decades, I have studied the investing principles practiced
and espoused by two of my investing heroes, Warren Buffett and Charlie
Munger.33' This Article has already referenced Buffett's advice on low-cost
investing. Munger probably is a lesser-known billionaire than Buffett, but
he still holds a respectable rank on the Forbes list with a net worth of $1.3
billion.332 Munger has served as Buffett's partner and vice chairman of
Berkshire Hathaway, among many other ventures, for nearly four
decades. 333 Recently, Munger encapsulated his thoughts on what type of
behavior often drives the money-management industry:
Back in 2000, venture-capital funds raised $100 billion and put it
into Internet startups-$100 billion! They would have been
better off taking at least $50 billion of it, putting it into bushel
baskets and lighting it on fire with an acetylene torch. That's the
kind of madness you get with fee-driven investment management.
Everyone wants to be an investment manager, raise the
maximum amount of money, trade like mad with one another,
and then just scrape the fees off the top. I know one guy, he's
331. See, e.g.,

MARY

BUFFETT

&

DAVID

CLARK,

BUFFETTOLOGY:

THE PREVIOUSLY

UNEXPLAINED TECHNIQUES THAT HAVE MADE WARREN BUFFETT THE WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS
INVESTOR (1997); ALICE SCHROEDER, THE SNOWBALL: WARREN BUFFETT AND THE BUSINESS OF
LIFE (2008); KILPATRICK, supra note 310; JANET LOWE, DAMN RIGHT!: BEHIND THE SCENES
WITH BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY BILLIONAIRE CHARLIE MUNGER

(2000);

JANET LOWE, WARREN

(1997); CHARLES
T. MUNGER (Peter

BUFFETT SPEAKS: WIT AND WISDOM FROM THE WORLD'S GREATEST INVESTOR

T. MUNGER,

POOR CHARLIE'S ALMANAC: THE WIT AND WISDOM OF CHARLES

D. Kaufman ed. 2008); L.J.

RITTENHOUSE, BUFFETT'S BITES: THE ESSENTIAL INVESTOR'S GUIDE
TO WARREN BUFFETT'S LETTERS (2010). I commend that you read all of Buffett's letters to his

limited partners when he was running hedge funds and all of his letters to the shareholders
of Berkshire Hathaway; similarly, I commend all of the letters to Wesco shareholders written
by Munger. Finally, in addition to reading everything written by or about Buffett and
Munger, I also have attended many Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholder's Meetings,
routinely referred to as the Woodstock of Capitalists. Warren Buffett, Letter to the
Shareholders24, February 28, 2014, availableat
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20131tr.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
332. FORBES, The Worlds Billionaires-CharlesMunger, http://www.forbes-com/profile
/charles-munger/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
333. Id.
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extremely smart and a very capable investor. I asked him, "What
returns do you tell your institutional clients you will earn for
them?" He said, "20%." I couldn't believe it, because he knows
that's impossible. But he said, "Charlie, if I gave them a lower
number, they wouldn't give me any money to invest!" The
investment-management business is insane."'
I wonder if Munger, who graduated from Harvard Law School and founded
the renowned law firm of Munger, Tolles & Olson, would characterize as
"insane" the fact that no court has ever found that an investment adviser
had breached its fiduciary duty under section 36(b). I contend that justice
cannot be achieved as long as there is no adjudicated illustration of an
investment adviser's breach of its section 36(b) fiduciary duty.335 The next
334. Jason Zweig, A Fireside Chat with Charlie Munger, MONEYBEAT (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/12/a-fireside-chat-with-charlie-munger/?mod=
yahoohs (emphasis added). See FRED SCHWED JR., WHERE ARE THE CUSTOMERS' YACHTS: OR A
GOOD HARD LOOK AT WALL STREET (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2006) ('At the end of the day [fund
managers] take all the money and throw it up in the air. Everything that sticks to the ceiling
belongs to the clients.").
335. Even though the Gartenberg-Jones standard can seem fatuous and airy when applied
to real cases, two outposts are visible and helpful. First, the free market is not the sole
regulator of compensation for investment advisers. Judge Easterbrook's narrow reading of
section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty gained no traction and is not the law. Second, the judiciary
does riot
have the authority to engage in fee-setting, rate-making, or to determine the
fairness of investment advisory fees generally. What is waiting, however, is a specific
illustration in a disputed case of what a breach of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty looks like.
Although there is no such case currently, it would seem that certain fact patterns contend for
the first-in-time victory. These fact patterns inevitably will showcase captive-like funds with
little arm's-length bargaining power under free-market conditions. To aid the discussion,
please allow me to predict a few.
First, as Judge Posner and the Eighth Circuit intimated, the best indicator of what
arm's-length bargaining would produce is to compare what an investment adviser charges its
institutional, non-fund clients against what it charges captive, fund clients. Although the
investment adviser will always claim that the fees are disparate because the services
performed are incomparable, this comparison seems to be the most fertile field for breaches
of fiduciary duty. At some point, the law should begin to clarify the outer limits on the
acceptable range of disparate fees for similarly situated clients, one with unfettered access to
bargaining versus another with limited access to true, free-market bargaining. Along these
lines, the absolute best comparator, however, might be in a case in which a mutual fund
actually competed for investment advisory services, rather than simply "negotiating" with
the adviser who holds it captive.
Second, fund shareholders should analyze whether the investment adviser has
benefitted from economies of scale and whether the adviser has shared those with fund
shareholders. Congress focused on this eventual Gartenberg factor, and fund shareholders
should focus their efforts on this type of evidence. While doing so, however, it is prudent to
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section explores Judeo-Christian principles that tend to support this
contention.
VII. INVESTMENT ADVISERS' FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER SECTION 36(B) AND
EXCESSIVE FEE LITIGATION VIEWED THROUGH THE LENS OF A JUDEOCHRISTIAN WORLDVIEW

As indicated in my biographical footnote above, the Editorial Board of
the LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW asked me to draft this Article
exclusively for this Symposium Issue with its emphasis on the Christian
Worldview of Financial Markets. For weeks, I pondered how to incorporate
Judeo-Christian principles into my analysis of an investment adviser's
fiduciary duty under section 36(b) and the last four decades of excessive-fee
litigation to enforce that duty. I spent considerable time focusing on biblical
principles and illustrations that address the concept of fiduciary duty
generally. Section A sketches a brief outline of a few of those concepts. The
focus of my Article, however, does not lie in generalized or abstract
principles relating to fiduciary duty. I hope that you have realized by now
that instead, the thrust of my Article maintains that simply articulating clear
legal standards without the ability to apply them to real facts involving real
people results in an illusory and unjust standard. To that end, I attempt in
Section B to incorporate my thinking about Judeo-Christian principles and
illustrations that reveal the dangers of having only a theoretical
336
understanding of the law.

keep in mind that the amount of fees charged will never exist in a vacuum; instead, the
amount of fees must always be aligned to the services rendered. The overall focus in an
economies-of-scale analysis, therefore, will be on the massive increase in fees while the
overall services fail to increase at the same rate. Stated differently, if a well-informed investor
with the ability to shop around aggressively negotiated with an investment adviser to receive
various breakpoints for various asset levels, what would those breakpoints look like, and then
compare those to what captive fund shareholders were given.
Third, it seems almost entirely irrelevant for an investment adviser to set its fees
based on a comparison to what other advisers charge. The legal standard requires a focus on
what arm's-length bargaining would produce in a fees-for-service negotiation. It would be
nice to see some type of decisional matrix that compares various fact patterns relating to fees
charged and services rendered. At this point, we only know what is lawful; we do not know
what is unlawful.
Finally, the recent SEC enforcement case against an investment adviser who charged
significant fees while providing absolutely no advisory services probably will not repeat itself
often. But there can be no easier case when analyzing a breach of fiduciary duty as to fees
than this type of case involving run-of-the-mill fraud.
336. Because I absolutely believe that it is a worthwhile venture to ponder how JudeoChristian values and principles impact what it means to serve as a fiduciary to others, I
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A. FiduciaryDuty in the Judeo-ChristianTradition
The Judeo-Christian tradition is rich with teachings on the concept of
fiduciary duty. Some scholars argue that the legal concept of fiduciary duty
itself emanates from Judeo-Christian principles. 337 The key principle that
undergirds the Christian faith is embodied in Jesus' teaching of the Golden
Rule: "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you,
do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets."338 You will note
that all law hinges on a proper understanding and application of the Golden
Rule. Jesus did not pluck this principle out of thin air two thousand years
ago as part of His teaching ministry; instead, He enunciated a long-standing
principle from the Old Testament: "thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself."339 The guiding light for any fiduciary of faith must be the Golden
Rule.
In thinking about how best to illustrate the Golden Rule's impact on how
fiduciaries must act according to Judeo-Christian principles, I surveyed a
number of biblical teachings. I will discuss a few of them in the text below. I
also use extended footnotes to further share my thoughts that might guide
your thinking should you choose to delve deeper into these concepts,
principles, and illustrations.
The Parable of the Unjust Steward comes to mind as one of Jesus'
teachings that commands faithfulness when placed in a position of trust. 4 °
included Section A's general discussion in the Article. Section B, however, forms the core
response to my analysis of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty and, more directly, to the
unappetizing four decades of litigation trying to enforce it on a theoretical basis only.
337. See, e.g., Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Natural Law and the FiduciaryDuties of Business
Managers, 8 J.MARKETS & MORALITY 27 (2005); Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings
of Delaware'sModern CorporateFiduciaryDuties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 3
(2012); Mary Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality: Fiduciary Duties in Historical
Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61 (2004).
338. Matthew 7:12.
339. Leviticus 19:18.
340. Luke 16:1-13 is the only Gospel that recorded the Parable of the Unjust Steward:
And [Jesus] said also unto his disciples, There was a certain rich man, which
had a steward; and the same was accused unto him that he had wasted his
goods. And he called him, and said unto him, How is it that I hear this of thee?
give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest be no longer steward. Then
the steward said within himself, What shall I do? for my lord taketh away from
me the stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed. I am resolved what to
do, that, when I am put out of the stewardship, they may receive me into their
houses. So he called every one of his lord's debtors unto him, and said unto the
first, How much owest thou unto my lord? And he said, An hundred measures
of oil. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and sit down quickly, and write fifty.
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The principles that undergird the fiduciary duty readily can be seen as Jesus
recites this memorable parable:
He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much:
and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much. If
therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon,
who will commit to your trust the true riches? And if ye have not
been faithful in that which is another man's, who shall give you
that which is your own? No servant can serve two masters: for
either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold
to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and
mammon.
The clarity with which Jesus expounded on the Golden Rule in the Parable
of the Unjust Steward is sharp and exacting. This parable forces a fiduciary
to understand his duty of loyalty and to act in the interest of his beneficiary.
It seems evident that Justice Cardozo's exposition on the standard of care
for a fiduciary borrows freely from the Parable of the Unjust Steward.
In addition to His vivid illustration of the Golden Rule in the Parable of
the Unjust Steward, Jesus clearly and concisely expressed a fiduciary's
obligations when entrusted with another person's property in the Parable of
the Talents:
For the kingdom of heaven is as a man travelling into a far
country, who called his own servants, and delivered unto them
his goods. And unto one he gave five talents, to another two, and
to another one; to every man according to his several ability; and
straightway took his journey. Then he that had received the five
talents went and traded with the same, and made them other five
talents. And likewise he that had received two, he also gained
other two. But he that had received one went and digged in the
Then said he to another, And how much owest thou? And he said, An hundred
measures of wheat. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and write fourscore.
And the lord commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely: for
the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of
light. And I say unto you, Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of
unrighteousness; that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting
habitations. He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much: and
he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much. If therefore ye have not been
faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to your trust the true
riches? And if ye have not been faithful in that which is another man's, who
shall give you that which is your own? No servant can serve two masters: for
either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one,
and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon.
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earth, and hid his lord's money. After a long time the lord of
those servants cometh, and reckoneth with them. And so he that
had received five talents came and brought other five talents,
saying, Lord, thou deliveredst unto me five talents: behold, I have
gained beside them five talents more. His lord said unto him,
Well done, thou good and faithful servant: thou hast been
faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many
things: enter thou into the joy of thy lord. He also that had
received two talents came and said, Lord, thou deliveredst unto
me two talents: behold, I have gained two other talents beside
them. His lord said unto him, Well done, good and faithful
servant; thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make
thee ruler over many things: enter thou into the joy of thy lord.
Then he which had received the one talent came and said, Lord, I
knew thee that thou art an hard man, reaping where thou hast
not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed: And I was
afraid, and went and hid thy talent in the earth: lo, there thou
hast that is thine. His lord answered and said unto him, Thou
wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest that I reap where I
sowed not, and gather where I have not strawed: Thou oughtest
therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at
my coming I should have received mine own with usury. Take
therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath
ten talents. For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he
shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken
away even that which he hath.34
Jesus commanded that a fiduciary must diligently and competently pursue
without sloth or conflict the best interests of his principal. The Golden Rule
could require nothing less. The Parable of the Talents ably demonstrates
that not everyone has the same talents and should not be entrusted with
precisely the same amount of responsibility. But to each fiduciary to whom
property is entrusted, that fiduciary must ably and prudently manage,
protect, and invest that property for the principal's benefit. The better a
fiduciary performs, the more responsibility the fiduciary can bear; on the
contrary, the worse a fiduciary performs, the less responsibility-if any-the
fiduciary can bear.
The lesson that the Parable of the Talents teaches in terms of section
36(b)'s fiduciary duty is that when an investment adviser provides
outstanding services, the investment adviser should be rewarded with more
341. Matthew 25:14-30.

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:469

responsibility and pay. If I were to invert this principle and state it another
way, however, I would conclude that the more that an investment adviser
gets paid, the more services the adviser should provide. On the other hand,
less responsibility and pay are in order for the investment adviser who
offers poor services. Indeed, this lesson is a common theme that resounds in
Jesus' teachings: "For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be
much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will
ask the more."342
The Parable of the Unjust Steward and the Parable of the Talents are
prime illustrations that counsel the interpretation and application of section
36(b). Other Judeo-Christian principles also illustrate what it means to
serve as a trusted fiduciary, and many of these enlightened my thinking
about section 36(b). For example, I considered concepts and teachings such
as Covenant theology,343 stewardship, 4 the Jubilee,345 good faith and fair
3 48
dealing,"4 fraud and crooked dealing, 47 usury and unwise debt practices,
342. Luke 12:48.
343. See, e.g., Leviticus 25.
344. See 1 Corinthians4:1-2 ("Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of Christ,
and stewards of the mysteries of God. Moreover it is required in stewards, that a man be
found faithful."); see also Leviticus 6:2-5 ("If a soul sin, and commit a trespass against the
Lord, and lie unto his neighbour in that which was delivered him to keep, or in fellowship, or
in a thing taken away by violence, or hath deceived his neighbour; Or have found that which
was lost, and lieth concerning it, and sweareth falsely; in any of all these that a man doeth,
sinning therein: Then it shall be, because he hath sinned, and is guilty, that he shall restore
that which he took violently away, or the thing which he hath deceitfully gotten, or that
which was delivered him to keep, or the lost thing which he found, Or all that about which
he hath sworn falsely; he shall even restore it in the principal, and shall add the fifth part
more thereto, and give it unto him to whom it appertaineth, in the day of his trespass
offering.").
345. Leviticus 25:8-15.
346. See Psalms 15:1-5, 112:5-6; Luke 6:38; Proverbs 28:8.
347. See Deuteronomy 25:13-17 ("Thou shalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great
and a small. Thou shalt not have in thine house divers measures, a great and a small. But
thou shalt have a perfect and just weight, a perfect and just measure shalt thou have: that thy
days may be lengthened in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. For all that do such
things, and all that do unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord thy God."); Proverbs
11:1 ("A false balance is abomination to the Lord: but a just weight is his delight."); Proverbs
11:3-6, 18-20, 23-28, 30-31 ("The integrity of the upright shall guide them: but the
perverseness of transgressors shall destroy them. Riches profit not in the day of wrath: but
righteousness delivereth from death. The righteousness of the perfect shall direct his way: but
the wicked shall fall by his own wickedness. The righteousness of the upright shall deliver
them: but transgressors shall be taken in their own naughtiness.... The wicked worketh a
deceitful work. but to him that soweth righteousness shall be a sure reward. As righteousness
tendeth to life: so he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his own death. They that are of a
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and the Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard.3 49 There are countless
biblical principles and illustrations of what it means to shoulder the heavy
burden of a fiduciary duty, to be sure, but perhaps the prime examples of
unbending, unyielding fiduciaries can be found in the lives of Jesus and
Solomon.
In the Christian faith, Jesus was, is, and always will be the ultimate
fiduciary in that He voluntarily became the substitute for the sins of all
people.3"' Indeed, who else can compare to a Man who proclaimed, "This is
froward heart are abomination to the Lord: but such as are upright in their way are his
delight.... The desire of the righteous is only good: but the expectation of the wicked is
wrath. There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is
meet, but it tendeth to poverty. The liberal soul shall be made fat: and he that watereth shall
be watered also himself. He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing
shall be upon the head of him that selleth it. He that diligently seeketh good procureth
favour: but he that seeketh mischief, it shall come unto him. He that trusteth in his riches
shall fall: but the righteous shall flourish as a branch.... The fruit of the righteous is a tree of
life; and he that winneth souls is wise. Behold, the righteous shall be recompensed in the
earth: much more the wicked and the sinner."); Proverbs 20:10 ("Divers weights, and divers
measures, both of them are alike abomination to the Lord.").
348. See Exodus 22:25; Deuteronomy 15:7-11, 23:19-20; Ezekiel 18:8, 13, 17, 22:12; Leviticus
25:35-37; Luke 6:35; Proverbs22:7; Psalm 15:5; Matthew 25:27; Nehemiah 5:1-13; Isaiah 10:1-34.
349. Matthew 20:1-16 ("For the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an
householder, which went out early in the morning to hire labourers into his vineyard. And
when he had agreed with the labourers for a penny a day, he sent them into his vineyard.
And he went out about the third hour, and saw others standing idle in the marketplace, And
said unto them; Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatsoever is right I will give you. And
they went their way. Again he went out about the sixth and ninth hour, and did likewise.
And about the eleventh hour he went out, and found others standing idle, and saith unto
them, Why stand ye here all the day idle? They say unto him, Because no man hath hired us.
He saith unto them, Go ye also into the vineyard; and whatsoever is right, that shall ye
receive. So when even was come, the lord of the vineyard saith unto his steward, Call the
labourers, and give them their hire, beginning from the last unto the first. And when they
came that were hired about the eleventh hour, they received every man a penny. But when
the first came, they supposed that they should have received more; and they likewise received
every man a penny. And when they had received it, they murmured against the goodman of
the house, Saying, These last have wrought but one hour, and thou hast made them equal
unto us, which have borne the burden and heat of the day. But he answered one of them, and
said, Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me for a penny? Take that thine
is, and go thy way: I will give unto this last, even as unto thee. Is it not lawful for me to do
what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil, because I am good? So the last shall be first, and
the first last: for many be called, but few chosen.").
350. 2 Corinthians5:14-21 ("For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus
judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead: And that he died for all, that they which live
should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose
again. Wherefore henceforth know we no man after the flesh: yea, though we have known
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my commandment, That ye love one another, as I have loved you. Greater
love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." ''
Not only did Jesus preach this type of unending love, He illustrated it as a
fiduciary for others: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have
everlasting life. For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the
world; but that the world through him might be saved."35 2
Myron T. Steele, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Delaware, 35 3 published an article in the Notre Dame Journalof Legal Ethics
and Public Policy in which he referred to Jesus as the "perfect fiduciary. 35 4
Justice Steele explained that Jesus "was an utterly selfless steward sent to
Earth to provide humanity the promise of eternal inheritance," "taught
lessons in morality, including notions of loyalty and care toward others,"
Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more. Therefore if any man be in
Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new.
And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given
to us the ministry of reconciliation; To wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world
unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the
word of reconciliation. Now then we are ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech
you by us: we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made him to be
sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.");
Hebrews 10:10 ("By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus
Christ once for all."); 1 John 2:2 ("[H]e is the propitiation for our sins."); 1 Peter 3:18 ("For
Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God,
being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit."); Romans 6:23 ("For the wages
of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.").
351. John 15:12-13.
352. John 3:16-17; see Isaiah 53:3-5 ("He is despised and rejected of men; a man of
sorrows, and acquainted with grief: and we hid as it were our faces from him; he was
despised, and we esteemed him not. Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows:
yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our
transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon
him; and with his stripes we are healed."). For a short article analyzing John 3:16 under
traditional gift law principles, please see Tory L. Lucas, The Greatest Gift, LIBERTY LEG. 1. 2427 (Spring 2014).
353. POTTER
ANDERSON
CORROON,
LLP,
Attorneys: Myron
T. Steele,
http://www.potteranderson.com/attorneys-Myron-Steele.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
354. Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings of Delaware's Modern Corporate
FiduciaryDuties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2012); see Szto, supra note 337,
at 88 (citing Hebrews 3:1-6; Philippians2:4; 1 Peter 1:3-5) ("In Christian theology, Christ is
the perfect fiduciary. He is the selfless steward who lays down his life for others. By dying
and rising, he enables those who accept him to have an eternal permanent inheritance.
Christ is the bridge between death and life, time and eternity, temporal and permanent
property.").
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"embodied these morals about which He taught, and therefore served as an
example for mankind in the continued exercise of its fiduciary mandate to
' Justice Steele contends that although
steward the Earth in God's likeness."355
"early theological examples were not legal precepts during biblical times, ...
they nevertheless provide the starting point for the moral foundation of
modern corporate fiduciary duties. 3 56 Justice Steele explained, "Roman law
first tied these moral concepts to actual legal frameworks, which canon
lawyers later adopted in structures that eventually evolved into early trusts";
this led to "modern corporate fiduciary duties."357
I do not contend that Jesus is the legally enforceable example of how a
person satisfies his or her fiduciary duty. At least from the perspective of
trying to find the outer limits of how a fiduciary might treat his principal,
however, Jesus is hands-down the ultimate fiduciary in human history.
Although Jesus provides the perfect example of a selfless fiduciary, I am not
sure how to apply His life's example to the interpretation and application of
section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty to investment advisers. But that does not
mean that it is altogether wrong for investment advisers to contemplate
their moral authority and opportunity to reflect upon Jesus' life when living
their own. That rings true for all of us, at all times, in all that we do.
Another glowing example of how a fiduciary should strive to conduct
himself is found in King Solomon. Solomon was born into royalty as the
son of King David and Bathsheba, and the Bible declares that the Lord loved
Solomon. 35" King Solomon "reigned in Jerusalem over all Israel [for] forty
' The part of Solomon's story that intrigues me as it relates to
years."359
the
concept of fiduciary duty can be found in Solomon's approach to servant
leadership. As Solomon contemplated his enormous power and privilege,
he considered what he would want from God if he could only ask for it.
Carrying out his wishes as a steadfast and selfless fiduciary, Solomon
thought about others before he thought about himself:
In Gibeon the Lord appeared to Solomon in a dream by night:
and God said, Ask what I shall give thee. And Solomon said....
And now, 0 Lord my God, thou hast made thy servant king
instead of David my father: and I am but a little child: I know not
how to go out or come in. And thy servant is in the midst of thy
people which thou hast chosen, a great people, that cannot be
355. Steele, supra note 354, at 5.
356. Id. at 6.
357. Id.
358. 2 Samuel 12:24.
359. 1 Kings 11:42.
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numbered nor counted for multitude. Give therefore thy servant
an understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern
between good and bad:for who is able to judge this thy so great a
people? And the speech pleased the Lord, that Solomon had
asked this thing. And God said unto him, Because thou hast asked
this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life; neither hast
asked richesfor thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies; but
hast askedfor thyself understandingto discernjudgment; Behold, I
have done according to thy words: lo, I have given thee a wise and
an understanding heart; so that there was none like thee before
thee, neither after thee shall any arise like unto thee. And I have
also given thee that which thou hast not asked, both riches, and
honour: so that there shall not be any among the kings like unto
thee all thy days. And if thou wilt walk in my ways, to keep my
statutes and my commandments, as thy father David did walk,
360
then I will lengthen thy days.

Fiduciaries are held to the highest standards of prudence and loyalty.
Solomon displayed unyielding loyalty to his people when he sought their
interests before he sought his own. To some extent, section 36(b)'s fiduciary
duty mandates that investment advisers act a little bit Solomonesque in
dealing with their clients' money. Amazingly, it is probably as true for an
investment adviser as it is for Solomon that if an investment adviser puts
away his own interest for a time and selflessly seeks his client's best
interests, then the adviser will benefit in huge ways the way that Solomon
did.

36 1

I believe that every fiduciary, including investment advisers, would
benefit from thinking about how to incorporate Judeo-Christian principles
into their work. The task of incorporating these principles into the law's
interpretation and application of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty is left for

360. 1 Kings 3:3-15 (emphasis added); see 1 Chronicles 28-29; 2 Chronicles 1-9; Psalm 72
(A Psalm for Solomon).
361. Solomon was human like the rest of us. He, too, struggled with being selfish rather

than selfless as a fiduciary: "Did not Solomon king of Israel sin by these things? Yet among
many nations was there no king like him, who was beloved of his God, and God made him
king over all Israel: nevertheless even him did outlandish women cause to sin." Nehemiah
13:26. The lesson from Solomon seems to be, however, that any person who serves selflessly
as a fiduciary solely in the best interests of others will reap more rewards than a selfish
fiduciary will enjoy. The Bible often teaches this seemingly counter-factual, counter-intuitive
lesson of selflessness. See Matthew 16:25 ("For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and
whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it."); Matthew 20:16 ("So the last shall be

first, and the first last: for many be called, but few chosen.").
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another article, however. This Article contends that Judeo-Christian
principles admonish the creation of mere theoretical legal standards to
judge others. To the point, I contend that is precisely the unjust history of
section 36(b) litigation. The next section expounds on this idea.
B. Is the Law on Our Side or Are We on the Law's Side? Toward a Just
Application of Section 36(b)'s FiduciaryDuty
Justice requires unbiased application of precise legal standards to real
facts in real cases with real people to achieve consistent and predictable
outcomes. Section 36(b) litigation lacks an adjudicated illustration of how
an investment adviser breaches his fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt
of compensation. Without an appreciation of what conduct violates the law,
fund shareholders and investment advisers are left with interpreting the law
with a bias tilted in their favor. Justice cannot be achieved when competing
sides do not have an unbiased, arbitrated illustration of unlawful conduct.
This section attempts to explore how Judeo-Christian principles caution
against a mere theoretical understanding of the law. On the contrary,
Judeo-Christian principles teach that justice is achieved when we are all
subject to the same, precise governing legal standard that is consistently and
fairly applied as intended.
The timeless allure of trying to place the law on our side rather than
placing our conduct on the law's side is strong. President Abraham Lincoln
exposed this tension and temptation in stirring and convicting rhetoric. On
Saturday, March 4, 1865, while the brutal and costly American Civil War
was raging, President Lincoln delivered his Second Inaugural Address.
Addressing his "Fellow-Countrymen," which to him meant the entire
Union-whether North or South, Slave or Free-President Lincoln
declared:
Both [sides of the Civil War] read the same Bible and pray to the
same God, and each invokes His aid against the other. It may
seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's
assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's
faces, but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of
both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered
fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. "Woe unto the world
because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but
woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall
suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in
the Providence of God, must needs come, but which, having
continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove,
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and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as
the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern
therein any departure from those divine attributes which the
believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we
hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may
speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the
wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of
unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood
drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the
sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be
said "the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous
altogether."
With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness
in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to
finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds, to care
for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow and
his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and
lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.362
This Judeo-Christian sentiment was one of President Lincoln's core beliefs
and part of his overall worldview. In a similar and consistent vein, one
historian recounted of President Lincoln's hearing a clergyman express his
hope that "the Lord was on our side." In rebuke, President Lincoln declared,
"'I am not at all concerned about that, for I know that the Lord is always on
the side of the right. But it is my constant anxiety and prayer that I and this
363
nation should be on the Lord's side."

362. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2014).
363. F.B. CARPENTER, SIX MONTHS AT THE WHITE HOUSE WITH ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE
STORY OF A PICTURE 282 (1867). When I taught at Creighton University School of Law, I
attended a dinner with Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia told an amusing story about his
perception of the difference between liberal and conservative justices. Justice Scalia remarked
that his fidelity to the law emanates from his textualist approach to the interpretation and
application of what the law says. Instead of trying to figure out what lawmakers intended,
what is best for a society from a judge's perspective, or how law should evolve, Justice Scalia
said that he simply assumes that in making law, lawmakers say what they mean and mean

what they say. In carrying out his textualist philosophy, however, Justice Scalia reported that
he does not always like the result of his decisions. In many cases, his personal opinion of
what the law should be or the ideal outcome of a case differs from his judicial conclusion. He
explained that when he comes home from a hard day of judging, his wife, Maureen, often
asks, "Nino, how was your day?" Justice Scalia often responds, "Well, dear, it happened again
today. The law required a stupid result or one that I would not have chosen, but I had to
interpret and apply the law as written and not as I would have written it." When a liberal
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President Lincoln accurately sums up my thinking as it relates to how to
incorporate Judeo-Christian values and principles into American law and
my analysis of section 36(b) litigation. There always will be a tension or
temptation to use God to support our opinions or positions rather than
forming our opinions or taking our positions in the first instance from
God's standards. It seems commonplace for people to follow, knowingly or
unknowingly, the clergyman's statement in hoping that the Lord is on their
side, rather than asking that they be on the Lord's side. This counterproductive, self-fulfilling, selfish, and altogether-misguided temptation is
particularly acute when we confront the task of judging each otherwhether under God's Law or Man's Law-with a purported goal of justice,
fairness, and equality. When confronted with any legal standard, its
interpretation and application must be fairly and equally administered to be
just. The standard cannot change depending on one's vantage point; a fair
result in one case must inevitably lead to the same result in a similar case.
When it comes to an investment adviser's charging fees for services
provided to captive mutual funds, for example, justice demands that the
interpretation and application of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty standard
must not change whether you are an investment adviser, mutual fund
shareholder, or a court. One consistently interpreted and applied standard,
fully applicable to all, leads to justice; any other path leads to injustice.364
Jesus often illustrated the importance of subjecting yourself to the same
standards-legal or otherwise-to which you would subject others. His
admonition to follow the Golden Rule rings as loudly today as when He
uttered it, challenging us to do unto others as we would have others do unto
us.36 In fact, Jesus proclaimed that every law hinges upon the Golden Rule:

justice comes home from a hard day of judging, Justice Scalia paints a portrait of a radically

different conversation. When a liberal justice walks through the door at home and is greeted
with the how-was-your-day question, the liberal responds, "Honey, can you believe that I am

on an unbroken streak spanning 500 cases and fifteen years of judging where the outcome of
the case is exactly what I personally want and the law just happens to support what I want
every single time without fail!" Drawing an analogy between President Lincoln's admonition
and Justice Scalia's story, it is almost as though the liberal justice declares, "Wow, I hope that
the law is on my side, and believe it or not, it has been for a very long time!" At least
according to Justice Scalia, the conservative justice humbly asks, "I hope that I am on the
law's side." Obviously, these are not exact quotes. Instead, I have approximated quotes based
on my memory of what Justice Scalia said in order to share this amusing analogy with you. I
am sure that some readers are not amused.
364. See Amos 5:24 ("But let judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty
stream.").
365. See Matthew 7:12 ("Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to
you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets.").
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Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all
thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great
commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all
the law and the prophets.

66

In the story retold about President Lincoln above, if anyone should have
known and understood God's law, surely it would have been the poor
clergyman who was rebuked by President Lincoln. The clergyman did not
show an appreciation for the Golden Rule and the two great
commandments; instead, he sought an advantage in God's eyes. I can
almost hear God's retort, which President Lincoln tracked, "Go back and
learn Rules Number One and Two!"
Jesus spent significant time trying to get people to move out of their own
way. The problem seems to lie in our constant desire to place ourselves at
the center of everything. If everyone subscribed to that same worldview,
however, then the net result would be that no one and no value would be at
the center, if that makes sense. But it seems like human nature puts us front
and center, while we tend to place our neighbor in the back corner. Even as
Jesus exclaimed, "for I came not to judge the world, but to save the
world,"3 67 many people choose to pick up the mantle of judgment. Whether

using God's Law or Man's Law, it is a common temptation to judge others
under a standard that is disparate from the standard under which we would
judge ourselves. Jesus perhaps best illustrated this ageless temptation as
follows:
Judge not, that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge,
ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be
measured to you again. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in
thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own
eye? Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote
out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye? Thou
hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then
shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.368

366. Matthew 22:37-40 (emphasis added); Matthew 7:12.
367. John 12:47.
368. MaWlhew 7:1-5 (emphasis added). Along those lines, Jesus spared a woman who had
been convicted of adultery by posing a standards-based question of those who sought to
judge her: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." John 8:7. This
quotation might be misplaced, but it illustrates that a consistently interpreted and applied
standard under which we all can be judged leads to justice. Mercy is another topic. See Micah
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The legal standard that implements section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty must
be a standard under which we all can be judged equally, fairly, and
transparently. To be just, the recitation and application of this standard
cannot be based on self-interest, prejudice, bias, or point of view; it must be
consistent and predictable. This predictability and transparency leads to
self-regulating conduct instead of self-centered pursuit of a legal advantage.
The thrust here is that the interpretation and application of a just and
impartial standard requires that it apply equally to everyone. Without an
effective, adjudicated illustration of when and how a standard is violated,
however, then there essentially is no standard. Additionally, if one's
interpretation and application of a standard somehow changes when that
person's interest or vantage point changes, then it is clear that the person
suffers from a biased and self-interested understanding of the law. This is a
person who exemplifies the man who hopes that the Lord, i.e., the Law, is
on his side, and not that he is on the Lord's, i.e., the Law's, side. In section
36(b) litigation, adjudicated illustrations of when an investment adviser
breaches its fiduciary duty should be equally clear to all, regardless of
whether one views the issue from an investment adviser's or fund
shareholder's perspective. Because the timeless temptation to judge others
under a different standard than that which we apply to ourselves is never
going to dissipate, vivid illustrations of violations of section 36(b) are even
more important.
In my experience, the failure of the law to clearly indicate what behavior
falls outside the gambit of its governing legal standard results in three
equally disastrous courses of behavior. First, lack of legal clarity leads to
lawless behavior. Without a clearly interpreted and consistently applied
governing standard that leads to predictable results, individuals will take
liberties with their behavior. The Judeo-Christian worldview posits that
these liberties will run nearly every time in favor of the individual and
against another individual's interests. If everyone selfishly adhered to one's
own individual standard, then there would be no governing legal standard.
Unlike a person's selfish motives, the law is selfless and just. Second, the
inability to predict the outcome of contested behaviors or factual scenarios
causes conflict. The law's goal is not to create conflict; it tries to create a
common set of societal values that resolve conflict. When the law fails to set
a standard that effectively resolves actual disputes with real facts and real
people, then parties with opposing views will constantly find themselves in
conflict without the benefit of the law's powers of resolution. The

6:8 ("He hath shewed thee, 0 man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but
to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?").
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temptation will be to draw the lines of lawful conduct around one's
behavior and against another's. That is, investment advisers and fund
shareholders normally will not seek the application of the Golden Rule;
instead, each will seek the law's favor. Third, a legal standard that fails to
produce predictable penumbras of permissible behavior inevitably chills
behavior. When plaintiffs cannot predict when a defendant's conduct is
unlawful, this can lead plaintiffs to sue. Unguided by illustrations of
unlawful conduct, these plaintiffs will not always seek a legal adjudication
and a verdict, but often simply bring a strike suit in hopes of a settlement.
Defendants, on the other hand, might sing the song of compliance with the
governing legal standard, lip-synching behavior to the tune of legality.
When defendants lack illustrative knowledge, unfortunately, then they have
no guiding light to what conduct is actually-as opposed to theoreticallyunlawful.
Even in the face of a clear and consistently interpreted legal standard, the
law fails miserably when there are no judicial illustrations of what conduct
violates that legal standard. When the law provides no clarity on what
conduct is unlawful, it cannot inform a fund shareholder when to bring a
section 36(b) claim or allow an investment adviser to operate within the
outer limits of lawful behavior. As millions of fund shareholders and
investment advisers interact daily with tens of trillions of dollars at stake,
the law's failure to illustrate unlawful behavior creates uncertainty as to
whose position on fees is lawful.
To illustrate my point, an investment adviser might breach its fiduciary
duty even when it charges below-average fees. This could happen if that
adviser provides below-average services and a shareholder can show that
had arm's-length negotiations taken place between the fund and the adviser,
the fund never would have made such a fees-for-services agreement. I do
not promote a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose game stacked in favor of fund
shareholders. For example, in cases in which an investment adviser provides
industry-leading services, including returns on investment that trounce all
peers, I would expect that actual, arm's-length negotiations between noncaptive funds and the adviser likely would result in fees far exceeding
industry standards. There is absolutely nothing wrong with high fees. The
current state of the mutual-fund problem, however, is that neither fund
shareholders nor investment advisers (not to mention courts and attorneys)
can illustrate factually a judicially determined breach of an investment
adviser's fiduciary duty. That means that the chilling effect of this opaque,
cloudy area of the law actually might be forcing some investment advisers to
accept lower fees, believe it or not, while many other investment advisers
extract excessive fees while clinging to industry standards for justification.
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Until the law can illustrate when an investment adviser's fiduciary duty
actually is violated under concrete facts, then the risk of lawlessness
prevails.
My point is that quoting section 36(b) and the Gartenberg-Jones
standards and factors is insufficient. Justice lies in action, not theory. The
most profound biblical admonition that knowing a legal standard does not
mean that you have a clue as to how that legal standard governs actual
conduct is best illustrated by the Parable of the Good Samaritan.36 9 Jesus
was confronted by an attorney asking how to inherit eternal life.37 ° Jesus
responded, "What is written in the law?"371 Revealing his trained eagerness
to please teachers and judges, the attorney answered with the precise
governing standard, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,
and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and
thy neighbour as thyself."37 Jesus confirmed that the attorney had correctly
stated the law, showing at least head knowledge of the governing legal
standard. Jesus then elevated the discussion by leaving the theoretical and
academic realm by challenging the attorney on what it takes to actually
comply with those standards or commandments. 7 3 Jesus is not impressed
by a person's knowledge of the law, but by his ability to comply with its
mandate. The attorney, on the other hand, had no ability to see how the law
applied to real facts, so instead of applying the law, he chose to quibble over
the legal definition of neighbor. 374 At this point, Jesus provided seven
sentences that clearly and unequivocally illustrated how the law applied to
real facts involving real people:
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell
among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded
him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there
came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he
passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was
at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other
side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he
was: and when he saw him, he had compassion on him, And
went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine,
and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and
369. Luke 10:25-37.
370. Luke 10:25.
371. Luke 10:26.
372. Luke 10:27.
373. Luke 10:28.
374. Luke 10:29.
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took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took
out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him,
Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I
come again, I will repay thee. Which now of these three, thinkest
thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves? And
he said, He that shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto him,
Go, and do thou likewise.375
What does the Parable of the Good Samaritan have to do with section 36(b)
litigation? The text of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty is crystal clear, the
Gartenberg-Jones standard can be concisely stated, and the GartenbergJones.factors are well-defined. Following Jesus' approach to questioning the
attorney in the Parable of the Good Samaritan, I likewise ask you-whether
judge, attorney, academic, or student-if you can provide a clear and
unequivocal illustration of when an investment adviser breaches its
fiduciary duty with respect to the fees that it charges mutual funds. The
law's hesitant response screams injustice.
It is breathtaking to identify the people that Jesus used in the Parable of
the Good Samaritan. I hope that it is not lost on you that it was an attorney
who quizzed Jesus on the law. An attorney is trained to know the law and
how to apply it. The attorney was used to demonstrate that knowledge of
the law is worthless without a corresponding ability to apply it to real-world
facts. The attorney recited the law; this is similar to how just about every
court (with the rare exception of the Seventh Circuit) recites section 36(b),
the Gartenberg-Jones standard, and the Gartenberg-Jones factors. Courts
and attorneys might even possess analytical skills sharp enough to hone in
on certain words within the law, seeking more lucid legal definitions, just as
the attorney did with the term "neighbor." But the attorney's fatal flaw in
the Parable was his inability, even in the face of knowing the text of the law,
to understand when and how the law applied to real-world facts. That, too,
is the fatal flaw in decades of section 36(b) litigation in adjudicating breach
of fiduciary duty cases. That flaw leads to injustice.
It is equally breathtaking to realize that Jesus used a priest, a Levite, and a
Samaritan to illustrate how the law actually applied to real people and real
facts. It is convicting that Jesus chose to identify a priest and a Levite,
among all alternatives, to illustrate that knowing and reciting the law is not
even remotely close to knowing how to apply that law. In Jesus' day, one
could not describe two people more qualified to express and expound on

375. Luke 10:30-37. If only attorneys could communicate so clearly about the law and its
application.
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God's Law than a priest and a Levite7 6 But even though they knew and
could recite the law-and, God forbid, perhaps even controlled others'
access to the law or judged others under that law-the priest and the Levite
did not understand how to conduct their own lives to comply with the law. I
contend that the entire legal profession can articulate the law that governs
an investment adviser's fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of
compensation. Unfortunately, no member of the legal profession can
profess to know, with any degree of certainty, how that law actually applies
to contested cases with real people. There are no adjudicatory illustrations
of an investment adviser's violation of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty. As
demonstrated by the priest and Levite in the Parable of the Good Samaritan,
knowing the law and applying the law are two distinct attributes.
Employing both skills is the path to justice.
Without belaboring my point, unless I have passed it, another example
shows how simply knowing and reciting the law is insufficient. The SEC is
the congressionally designated expert on the law governing capital markets
and investment advisers.37 7 Congress provided the SEC with standing to
enforce an investment adviser's section 36(b) fiduciary duty." 8 If any
organization could clearly state the governing legal standard and then
identify factual scenarios that prove a violation of the law, surely the SEC
fits the bill. Until recently, it had been over three decades since the SEC
brought a section 36(b) claim against an investment adviser for breaching
its fiduciary duty. One can deduce that the SEC had concluded that the
mutual fund industry is entirely trustworthy or that the SEC cannot identify
a violation of section 36(b). Even though the SEC knows the law, it
apparently struggles to illustrate when that law is violated.
During oral arguments in Jones in 2010, the Solicitor General
acknowledged that the SEC had not filed a section 36(b) lawsuit against an
investment adviser in thirty years. 379 To Justice Scalia, the SEC's failure to
bring a section 36(b) suit combined with its focus on full disclosure of fee
information suggested to him "that the SEC may think that this is indeed a
self-contained industry and that the comparison with investment advice

376. See Numbers 18.
377. U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM'N, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC ProtectsInvestors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov
/about/whatwedo.shtml#.VXKSsAO (last visited Dec. 20, 2014); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)
(2010).

378. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
379. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 20-21, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335
(2010) (No. 08-586).
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given to other entities [is] not a fair one."3"' The Solicitor General
responded that "when the SEC helped draft the statute in the 1960s, it
recognized that there was this systematic disparity between the amounts
that mutual funds were being charged by investment advisers and the
amounts that investment advisers were charging their unaffiliated
clients.""' Why has the SEC sat idly on the sidelines for so long?
Perhaps you are thinking along the lines as Justice Scalia that because
Congress provided fund shareholders with a federal cause of action against
investment advisers and that those shareholders have been exercising their
rights to sue, there is no need to expend federal resources to have the SEC
bring section 36(b) claims. That is, just let private attorneys general foot the
bill to enforce federal law. That does not pass the smell test. It almost seems
preposterous to imagine that Congress spent considerable energy to debate
and pass a federally protected fiduciary duty, only to learn over four
decades that no investment adviser would ever violate that duty and the
SEC would be asleep at its post. Given the trillions of dollars in the mutual
fund industry, it seems impossible to conclude that no investment adviser
over a four-decade span ever overreached and violated its fiduciary duty
with respect to fees in a disputed case.
Let me use an analogy to illustrate this point. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits race discrimination, among other things; it was the
culmination of a long and hard-fought battle.3 2 Title VII empowers both
the Attorney General and private parties to enforce the federally protected
right to be free from unlawful race discrimination.3 3 After centuries of
barbaric slavery and segregation, imagine, if you will, if America had
witnessed decade after decade of private parties' bringing and losing federal
civil rights lawsuits under Title VII. I suspect that we as a nation would look
to the Attorney General to then enter the fray to carry out public policy
against unlawful and harmful discrimination. Despite its expertise in federal
civil rights law, its obligation to enforce that law, and its understanding that
no private plaintiff had ever proved a violation of Title VII, if the Attorney
General continued to sit idle without attempting to enforce Title VII, we
would be left with a couple of conclusions.
First, we could assume that the Attorney General believed that all is well
in America and no person had ever experienced unlawful racial

380. Id. at 21.
381. Id. at 21-22.
382. Major Features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

DIRKSEN CONGRESSIONAL CENTER,

http://www.civilrightsactof1964.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
383. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (2012).
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discrimination after Title VII was passed. Even with a vast and troubling
history filled with unspeakable racial injustice, apparently all that needed to
happen was for Congress to pass a statute declaring that race discrimination
was bad, and at that moment, all would be fixed, society would heal, and the
sins of the fathers would vanish from our memories. If that were the case,
we would expect the Attorney General to testify in Congress that either
Title VII could be repealed because it is no longer needed, or that Title VII
was working so swimmingly well that it should remain law. It would strain
credulity, however, to think that after a long and hard-fought struggle to
end the injustice of placing barriers to success based on the color of a
person's skin, that as soon as the law was enacted, all unlawful
discrimination magically ended. That tracks my sentiment of not believing
that after a long and hard-fought battle to legislate a federally protected
fiduciary duty for mutual fund shareholders against investment advisers
charging excessive fees, as soon as Congress passed section 36(b), like
magic, not a single investment adviser dared to charge an excessive fee.
Second, we might, on the other hand, assume that the Attorney General
believed that unlawful racial discrimination was still occurring, but for
some reason, the Attorney General could not figure out how to enforce the
law. Despite its knowledge of the law and its obligation to enforce it, the
Attorney General could not illustrate a set of facts in a single case that
proved racial discrimination. Justice would suffer if that had been the civil
rights history of race discrimination litigation. Perhaps that is the state of
affairs in section 36(b) litigation-the SEC simply cannot illustrate a set of
facts in a disputed case that proves that an investment adviser breached its
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation.
It is mind-blowingly difficult to ponder that trillions of dollars belonging
to hundreds of millions of people can be managed by thousands of firms
with tens of thousands of employees over four decades without a single
investment adviser being adjudged in a contested case to have violated its
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation. To pull this off
and believe that section 36(b) has never been violated, one almost is
required to suspend disbelief and enter an alternative reality.3"4
384. Speaking of an alternative reality, in the Harry Potter series, Professor Sybil Patricia
Trelawney was portrayed as an expert in divination at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and
Wizardry. She apparently possessed the gift of prophecy; she had been credited with
prophesying that a good wizard would be born who would destroy the evil wizard, Lord
Voldemort (tempting fate, I have named he-who-should-not-be-named). When Dolores
Jane Umbridge became the ruthless Headmistress of Hogwarts, she openly taunted and
belittled Professor Trelawney. In front of students, Headmistress Umbridge openly
challenged Professor Trelawney to "predict something," mocking her that she could not even
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Justice requires that friend and foe be judged consistently under the same
governing standard. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. vividly illustrated how the
Golden Rule requires consistent action vice theoretical rhetoric. He
preached that justice requires not just knowing the law, but consistently
living it. On the day before he was assassinated at the young age of 39, Dr.
King spoke in Memphis to support striking sanitation workers. His final
speech on Earth focused, in part, on Jesus' Parable of the Good Samaritan
and the urgent need for an actual and active-rather than theoreticalunderstanding of God's Law:
Be concerned about your brother [because] either we go up
together, or we go down together. Let us develop a kind of
dangerous unselfishness. One day a man came to Jesus, and he
wanted to raise [a] question[] about some vital matters of life
[such as what it means to love your neighbor as yourself]....
Now that question could have easily ended up in a philosophical
and theological debate. But Jesus immediately ... placed it on a

dangerous curve between Jerusalem and Jericho. And he talked
about a certain man, who fell among thieves. You remember that
a Levite and a priest passed by on the other side. They didn't stop
to help him. And finally a man of another race came by. He got
down from his beast, decided not to be compassionate by proxy.
But he got down with him, administered first aid, and helped the
man in need. Jesus ended up saying, this was the good man, this
was the great man, because he had the capacity to project the "I"
into the "thou," and to be concerned about his brother.
Now you know, we use our imagination a great deal to try to
determine why the priest and the Levite didn't stop.... I'm going
to tell you what my imagination tells me. It's possible that those
men were afraid. You see, the Jericho road is a dangerous
road.... It's a winding, meandering road. It's really conducive
for ambushing. You start out in Jerusalem, which is about...
1200 feet above sea level. And by the time you get down to
Jericho, fifteen or twenty minutes later, you're about 2200 feet
below sea level. That's a dangerous road. In the days of Jesus it
came to be known as the "Bloody Pass." And you know, it's

come up with a single, tiny prophecy. Similar to Professor Trelawney's inability to articulate

a single prophecy while claiming such expertise, it seems altogether strange and disturbing
that legal experts are likewise incapable of coming up with a single adjudicated illustration of
how an investment adviser can violate section 36(b). In the quizzical words of Headmistress

Umbridge, not even one tiny example.
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possible that the priest and the Levite looked over that man on
the ground and wondered if the robbers were still around. Or it's
possible that they felt that the man on the ground was merely
faking. And he was acting like he had been robbed and hurt, in
order to seize them over there, lure them there for quick and easy
seizure. And so the first question that the priest asked-the first
question that the Levite asked was, "If I stop to help this man,
what will happen to me?" But then the Good Samaritan came by.
And he reversed the question: "If I do not stop to help this man,
what will happen to him?" That's the question before you
tonight. Not, "If I stop to help the sanitation workers, what will
happen to my job." Not, "If I stop to help the sanitation workers
what will happen to all of the hours that I usually spend in my
office every day and every week as a pastor?" The question is not,
"If I stop to help this man in need, what will happen to me?" The
question is, "If I do not stop to help the sanitation workers, what
will happen to them?" That's the question. Let us rise up tonight
with a greater readiness. Let us stand with a greater
85
determination.
Dr. King's timeless and inspiring words are a proper bookend to President
Lincoln's words that began this section. What is my point? Like moral
obligations, the law does not exist in a theoretical realm. That is where
injustice lies in wait, urging each one of us to reach separate legal
conclusions on what the law authorizes, always drawing the line in our
favor. This is the house of conflict. Justice calls us to a higher purpose;
justice requires action. Justice requires the consistent and fair application of
a precise governing legal standard to real facts with real people in real cases.
When this happens, free people can order their lives under the transparent
operation of just laws. And that is precisely what Judeo-Christian principles
teach, as we have been reminded by Jesus, President Lincoln, and Dr. King.
It is time for a court in a contested case to find a factual illustration that
proves a breach of section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty. It is time that justice casts
38 6
its sanitizing sunlight over the captive retail mutual fund industry.
385. Martin Luther King, Jr., I've Been to the Mountaintop (Apr. 3, 1968), available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkivebeentothemountaintop.htm.
386. See Tory L. Lucas, To Catch a Criminal, to Cleanse a Profession: Exposing Deceptive
Practices by Attorneys to the Sunlight of PublicDebate and Creatingan Express Investigation
Deception Exception to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 89 NEB. L. REv. 219
(2010) (utilizing disinfecting sunlight language on another issue). Until the path is lit with a
guiding, sanitizing light, Jesus' Parable of the Blind Leading the Blind comes to mind: "Can
the blind lead the blind? [Slhall they not both fall into the ditch?" Luke 6:39.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

With trillions of dollars of hard-working Americans hanging in the
balance, it is vital that justice shines on the mutual fund industry. Section
36(b)'s fiduciary duty has regulated the collection of advisory fees by
investment advisers for forty-five years without a clear vision in a contested
case of when an investment adviser charges excessive fees. This judicial
deficiency stands in stark contrast to the purpose behind section 36(b)'s
enactment, namely, that the mutual fund industry endures structural
conflicts of interest with captive fund shareholders having little or no ability
to utilize free-market, arm's-length bargaining to lower investment fees.
Until a case illustrates a violation of section 36(b), justice will be impaired.
And injustice will cascade upon injustice as high fees dampen investment
returns over time.
Fund shareholders ultimately will claim their first judicial victory, but
until then, we should recognize that when it comes to money, everyone will
not play fairly, politely, ethically, or legally. A well-known biblical
'
admonition cautions that "the love of money is the root of all evil."387
Money seemingly draws crooks and criminals to its ambit. But when it
comes to the federally protected fiduciary duty that protects millions of
retail investors entrusting trillions of dollars to investment advisers from
overpaying for investment advisory services, the mutual fund industry is
apparently without sin. Most people reading this Article are shaking their
heads in disbelief, exclaiming that this cannot be a four-decade reality.
Regardless of collective disbelief, however, no court has found a violation of
section 36(b)'s fiduciary duty in a contested case.
No matter how the law ultimately illustrates the outer limits of an
investment adviser's fiduciary duty on fees, it cannot happen soon enough.
387. 1 Timothy 6:10. Here is the quotation in full context: "But godliness with
contentment is great gain. For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can
carry nothing out. And having food and raiment let us be therewith content. But they that
will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which
drown men in destruction and perdition. For the love of money is the root of all evil: which
while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through
with many sorrows. But thou, 0 man of God, flee these things; and follow after
righteousness, godliness, faith, love, patience, meekness." Id. at 6:6-11 (emphasis added). To
illustrate how people behave badly when the love of money is at their core, let's just play a
little word association. When I provide you with a name, please make a mental note of what
immediately comes to mind. Allen Stanford. Charles Ponzi. Raj Rajaratnam. Bernie Madoff.
Ken Lay. Martha Stewart. I suspect that certain terms readily come to mind, such as moneygrubbing, greedy, criminal, Ponzi (not surprising, particularly when in reference to Charles
Ponzi), crooked, unethical, or words unfit for civil discourse generally or for inclusion in the
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.
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Justice requires a consistently and fairly applied standard to real cases. Even
though the Gartenberg-Jones standard and factors are crystal clear, the lack of
an adjudicated illustration of a violation of section 36(b) neuters the law such
that there really is no standard. Injustice results when we judge people's
conduct without clear, enforceable, predictable standards. In a multi-trillion
dollar industry ripe with conflicts of interest and lacking traditional markers of
free market competition, it is vital that justice treats everyone-particularly
captive fund shareholders-under a clearly articulated, consistently applied,
easily illustrated standard. When that decision is announced, it will usher in a
healthy dose of sanitizing sunlight.3"'

388. To compound the nightmare that captive, passive retail investors experience when it
comes to the drag on their investment returns from high fees, consider the case of Tibble v. Edison
Int'l, 729 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013), that is currently pending before the Supreme Court. Tibble,
135 S. Ct. 43 (Oct. 2,2014) (granting awrit of certiorari asking "[wihether a claim that ERISA plan
fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence by offering higher-cost retail-class mutual funds to
plan participants, even though identical lower-cost institution-class mutual funds were available, is
barred by 29 U.S.C. § 1113(1) when fiduciaries initially chose the higher-cost mutual funds as plan
investments more than six years before the claim was filed."). The basic thrust of the investors'
complaint is that pension plan fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence by choosing higher-fee
retail funds when identical-but-cheaper institutional funds were equally available. Tibble, 729 F.3d
at 1137. Oral arguments took place on February 24, 2015. Transcript of oral Argument, Tibble v.
Edison Int'l, 135 S. Ct. 1193 (No. 13-550). Interestingly and notably, on February 23, 2015, i.e., the
day before the Court held oral arguments in Tibble, President Barack H. Obama "directed the
Department of Labor to move forward with a proposed rulemaking to protect families from bad
retirement advice by requiring retirement advisers to abide by a 'fiduciary' standard-putting their
clients' best interest before their own profits." WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE PRESS SEC'Y, FACT SHEET:
Middle Class Economics: Strengthening Retirement Security by Cracking Down on Backdoor
Payments and Hidden Fees (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015
/02/23/fact-sheet-niddle-class-economics-strengthening-retirementsecuritycrac. To support a
newly created fiduciary-duty standard for all retirement and investment advisers, President
Obama made the following argument:
A system where Wall Street firms benefit from backdoor payments and hidden
fees if they talk responsible Americans into buying bad retirement
investments-with high costs and low returns-instead of recommending
quality investments isn't fair. These conflicts of interest are costing middle class
families and individuals billions of dollars every year. On average, they result in
annual losses of 1 percentage point for affected investors. To demonstrate how
small differences can add up: A 1 percentage point lower return could reduce
your savings by more than a quarter over 35 years. In other words, instead of a
$10,000 retirement investment growing to more than $38,000 over that period
after adjusting for inflation, it would be just over $27,500.
Id. Does all of this sound familiar? No matter how all of these inflated-fee and conflict-ofinterest issues ultimately will be resolved, one thing is certain-sunlight is indeed shining on
the fees that investment advisers charge to millions of average Americans. Billions and
billions of dollars hang in the balance.

